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2020-C
The Model T120/M1 Sniperscope & Snooperscope
Use During WWII by Jim Mock USCarbineCal30.com
February 18, 2020 Introduction
Over
the years, documents have been located providing bits and pieces of
information regarding the use of the Sniperscopes and Snooperscopes
during WWII. The most recent summary of first-hand documents was an
article by Don Hillhouse published in Carbine Club Newsletter 368 (Nov
2011).
Ongoing research has since located additional documents.
The most significant of which has been Operational Report on Infrared
Equipment, by Captain Omar L. Patterson, U.S. Army Corps of Engineers
dated 30 Apr 1945 (1). Capt. Patterson was the head of a
three-man Engineers infrared equipment training and evaluation team
assigned to the Pacific Ocean Area of operations that included Okinawa.
The Corps of Engineers trained a total of four teams for this purpose,
with each team assigned to a different operational area (2).
The reports prepared by the other teams have yet to be located, but
supporting documents included with Capt. Patterson’s report provides
details into the activities of one of the other teams. Separate sources
have been located that provide a glimpse into the activities of the
other teams.
Each team was tasked with training combat personnel
in the maintenance and operation of the Sniperscopes and Snooperscopes,
issuing the equipment, then evaluating and reporting on everything from
logistical needs to effectiveness in combat.
The contract for the
production of the T120/M1 Sniperscopes and Snooperscopes was granted to
Electronic Laboratories of Indianapolis by the U.S. Army Corps of
Engineers in December 1943. Production started several months
thereafter. The contract was completed by April 1944 (3) but
had exceeded the production capabilities of the image tube by RCA. At
the time, RCA was the only manufacturer and had yet to produce the
quantities already contracted by the Navy. The Navy infrared equipment
had become strategically significant to their overall operations in the
Pacific. For security the Navy objected to the deployment
of the IR equipment by ground troops (4). These issues will
be addressed separately from this article in the upcoming web pages
detailing a much broader history of this equipment.
A sufficient
number of image tubes had become available for the Corps of Engineers to
schedule the first shipments of the Sniperscopes and Snooperscopes and
training teams by the end of September 1944. The three teams headed west
across the Pacific with a stop in Hawaii, where the equipment was
demonstrated to the command staff of the Tenth Army on Oahu in November
1944. The Tenth Army had been recently formed for the invasion of
Okinawa, with their troops spread throughout the Pacific and South
Pacific actively engaged in operations under other commands. Their
widespread locations necessitated the training of additional training
teams from the Engineer’s training staff on Oahu. Followed by
transportation by ship to the various training locations, arriving
during January and February 1945.
The progress of the war in the
Pacific had narrowed the opportunities for trials on a scale required
for the evaluations the Engineer teams had been tasked with. The
invasion of and combat on Okinawa was the last opportunity before the
invasion of Japan.
(Note: Sources used and cited in this article or
copies thereof have been examined first hand to avoid the repeating of
mistakes found in second hand and later accounts during the research of
this article.) _________________________________________________________________________________ PRELUDE - CORPS OF ENGINEERS The
four three-man teams from the Corps of Engineers underwent two weeks
training June 19 to July 1, 1944, at the Engineers School, Fort Belvoir,
VA (1, 2). Each team was comprised of an officer and two
enlisted personnel having backgrounds in electronics, optics, and
research. They were not Combat Engineers.
In the 18 Sep 1944
Minutes of the War Department General Council, General Borden of the New
Developments Division was reported to have indicated shipments of the
Sniperscopes and Snooperscopes were scheduled as follows (5).
Capt.
Patterson’s team received their deployment orders on 29 Sep 1944. His
team was directed to proceed to their assigned area of operations and
report to the commanding general on temporary assignment for 6 months.
The orders indicated they were to take the Snooperscopes, Sniperscopes,
Metascopes (Type F), and related equipment with them. Their mission
objectives were as follows (6).
- To conduct such tests as may be directed by the theater commander for the purpose of exploiting the use of this equipment
- To provide adequate maintenance for the infra-red equipment
- To
instruct personnel designated by the Commanding General, Pacific Ocean
Area, in the use, operation, and maintenance of this equipment
- To estimate spare parts and supply needs
- To determine maintenance problems and methods of handling
- To determine necessary changes in the equipment
- To investigate enemy deployment of infrared
- To introduce the Snooperscope and Sniperscope equipment
- To determine the potential value and uses of the equipment mentioned above
- To report immediately any developments indicating changes in supply program or required design.
- To
submit monthly reports giving a complete record of tests and
instructions; these reports to be submitted through channels to Office,
Chief of Engineers, attention Engineering and Development Division.
Reports submitted were to include detailed information concerning:
a. Maintenance & Supply Adequacy
of spare parts, amount of maintenance required, operating life of
equipment, maintenance personnel required and special problems b. Training & Administration Sources of personnel, time required for training, training and administrative problems c. Employment of Equipment Tactical
applications and methods, distribution, effect of operator fatigue,
adequacy of equipment, and effective ranges d. Improvement Suggestions for changes growing out of our own use or due to enemy countermeasures e. Enemy use of infra-red devices Description of enemy infra-red equipment, it’s employment and countermeasures f. Capture of our Equipment by the Enemy Report immediately setting forth the circumstances and probable condition of equipment when captured
At
least initially, the same orders were likely issued to all four teams.
Those assigned to the Pacific and China/Burma/India areas probably
received their orders at or about the same time.
Engineers Board
Report 908 dated January 1945 identifies the training teams, their
assigned areas, and shipments completed by 01 Jan 1945 along with the
total number of Sniperscopes and snooperscopes having been produced with
all production having been completed (2).
Operational circumstances and needs changed by
the time the Sniperscopes and Snooperscopes were issued to the troops. This required drawing from the
allocations to the South and Southwest Pacific area to train and equip
elements of the Army and Marines assigned to the invasion of Okinawa.
Additional
quantities may have been shipped from the remaining stateside inventory
after this data was submitted, but in time for deployment during combat
operations in the Pacific, including Okinawa.
Before proceeding
into the detailed report of Capt. Patterson’s team on Okinawa, a summary
is provided of the information found so far on the other three teams.
European Theater Team
The
Germans were known to possess several types of infrared viewers before
this team was deployed. Several had already been captured and evaluated
by the Allies (2). For fear the Germans would use their
devices to see those used by the Allies, the British issued orders for
their infrared devices, other than those in use by their Navy, to be
kept in the U.K. The
Germans deployed their infrared equipment on the Eastern Front but held
them back from front line use on the Western Front as they were aware
the Western Allies possessed the technology. Those found on the Western
Front at the end of the war were found in the rear areas and a training
unit. The troops who had used the equipment on the Eastern Front brought
it with them to the Western Front. They were sent into combat
without the equipment.
The book Applied Physics: Electronics,
Optics, Metallurgy Office of Scientific Research and Development
published in May 1948 indicates the Sniperscope and snooperscope “did
not see action in the European Theater” (page 243). Much of the other
information regarding the Sniperscope and snooperscope provided in this
book was obtained from prior publications without citation. Some of this
information is contrary to other documents authored by those with
first-hand experience.
A communication from the HQ 1st U.S.
Infantry Division, G-4 (Logistics) Journal dated 01 Mar 1945, was
attached to Capt. Patterson’s report. The 1st U.S. Infantry Division G-4
in Drove, Germany (Duren, Koln, Nordrhein-Westfalen, Germany) informed
his Division Commander the Sniperscopes and Snooperscopes were to be
used for training purposes only and not deployed near combat operations.
A record was to be kept of where the scopes were sent for training.
In
response to an order from the Infantry Branch, G-3 Requirements
Section, Army Ground Forces, the Army Ground Forces Board, Mediterranean
Theater of Operations submitted a summary dated 12 Mar 1945 of various
new weapons evaluated by units under their command. This document was
among those regarding the evaluations of the model M2 carbine. A short
paragraph at the end of this document indicates “about 25” of the
Sniperscopes were received by the Fifth Army the first week in March
1945 but had not been distributed to the divisions as yet.
No further information has been found on the European Theater team and their operations.
China/Burma/India Area Team
The
team assigned to the China/Burma/India area of operations conducted
training in Burma concurrent with the training being conducted by Capt.
Patterson’s team in the Pacific during February 1945. The limited number
of Snooperscopes and Sniperscopes (25 each) allocated to this area
infers the training and evaluations were limited in scope, but the
equipment was likely used in this area before the war ended.
Capt. Carl E. Glock, Corps of Engineers, CBI team, training members of the 475th Infantry Regiment of the U.S. MARS Task Force, in the use of the Sniperscope in Burma (February 1945)
(photos copyrighted by Critical Past) No further information has been found on the China/Burma/India team and their operations.
South Pacific Ocean Area & SW Pacific Ocean Area Team
American
ground forces assigned to the invasion of Okinawa were spread
throughout the Pacific, finishing up other operations when the time came
to prepare and train for Okinawa. This team was reassigned to assist
Capt. Patterson’s team with training and equipping the Okinawa forces
located in the South Pacific on Espiritu Santo and in the area of
Guadalcanal. The
initial 400 Snooperscopes and 200 Sniperscopes allocated to this area
may have been supplemented with additional scopes from stateside
inventories by the time the equipment was issued to the troops. From the
inventory assigned to this team, 395 Snooperscopes and 215 Sniperscopes
were issued to the Okinawa invasion forces of the III Amphibious Corps
(USMC) and 27th Infantry Division (U.S. Army). Further details regarding
their involvement with Okinawa are incorporated below with the
information on Okinawa and Capt. Patterson’s team.
Several
documents have indicated the Sniperscopes were used on Leyte and Luzon
islands and during the cleanup in the Philippines. These locations were
within the South Pacific area of operations. Use on Leyte was during
training for Okinawa. None of the training for Okinawa took place on
Luzon. The invasion and combat on Luzon took place from 9 January – 15
August 1945. Given the quantities issued January to March 1945 to the
Okinawa invasion forces, the number available for use during the invasion
of Luzon would have been limited. It is possible quantities may have
been transferred to Luzon after Okinawa.
No reports prepared by the Engineer team assigned to this area have been located. _________________________________________________________________________________ PRELUDE - OKINAWA The Tenth Army
As
the teams were being trained in Virginia, plans in the Pacific were
underway for the anticipated invasion of Formosa with the intent of
using Formosa as the staging area for the invasion of Japan. The Tenth
Army was created for this purpose when it was activated on Oahu, Hawaii,
in June 1944. Lt. General Simon Buckner Jr. was summoned to Oahu from
operations in the Aleutian Islands in Alaska to organize the Tenth Army
and eventually assume command. During the planning stages, the invasion
of Formosa was canceled in favor of an invasion of the Ryukyus Islands
instead. The largest island of the Ryukyus was considered better suited
for use as a staging area for the invasion of Japan. The island was
Okinawa (7). The invasion was designated Operation Iceberg. A Tenth Army report documenting the preparations undertaken for the invasion of Okinawa (8) indicates
a team of Engineers with 25 Snooperscopes and 25 Sniperscopes provided
Tenth Army HQ on Oahu with a demonstration of the equipment in late
November 1944. Tenth Army HQ then requested the Commanding General of
the Engineers of U.S. Forces Pacific Ocean Area to provide training
teams and instruct the various units of the Marine Corps and Army Corps
assigned to the Tenth Army in the use and maintenance of the equipment.
Included was a request for 140 Snooperscopes and 110 Sniperscopes per
division (6 division total). All training was to be completed and
equipment issued in time for use during the invasion of Okinawa. The
report does not identify which Engineer team conducted the
demonstration.
Shortly thereafter, Capt. Patterson’s Pacific
Ocean Area team was provided with training personnel for four additional
maintenance/instruction teams from Engineers Combat Training Command
(APO 957) at Schofield Barracks on Oahu. These teams were trained on
Oahu by Capt. Patterson’s team (1).
Oahu was also the
staging area for Engineers who fabricated and prepared various materials
and equipment for use by the Tenth Army during the Okinawa operation. A
list of items fabricated on Oahu included 800 flash hiders for the
Sniperscopes (9). So far, this has been the only
documentation found regarding flash hiders and Okinawa.
It is not known if they were used or who used them. After action reports
by the Marines recommended flash hiders be developed for the carbines
equipped with Sniperscopes (1).
Training the Tenth Army
The
Army and Marine units assigned to the Tenth Army were actively
conducting operations throughout the Pacific Ocean area under other
commands when notified they were to be assigned to the Tenth Army for
Okinawa. The Army units were not released from their tactical
responsibilities to join the Tenth Army until 10 February 1945. The
great distances that separated the elements of the Tenth Army, together
with the limited time available, precluded combined training. Capt.
Patterson’s team, with their four teams from Combat Training Command,
split up and enlisted the assistance of the Engineer team assigned to
the South/Southwest Pacific Area (Capt. Eugene S. Cornish) to train the
various units in all of the far-flung locations. Training in the use of
the equipment was provided to all available personnel as opposed to a
limited number to which the equipment would be assigned.
Lt.
General Buckner Jr.’s request for 140 Snooperscopes and 110 Sniperscopes
per division could not be met due to the limited quantities available.
Priority was given to the infantry regiments involved in the initial
assault and expected to be involved in combat for the duration (1).
*April 1945 Assigned Strength rather than Actual Effective Strength, included in hospital past 60 days (7) **exact dates specific to Sniperscope and Snooperscope training not indicated _________________________________________________________________________________ OKINAWA INVASION APRIL 1945 The Island of Okinawa
Okinawa
is approximately 70 miles long, an average of 7 miles wide, with a
landmass of 466.02 sq. miles. The terrain is primarily mountains and
jungles in the north, with ridges separating large open areas in the
south. The civilian population was approximately 500,000. The
Battle of Okinawa was preceded by the 77th Infantry Division invasion
of the Kerama Islands southwest of Okinawa on March 26, 1945, for use as
a staging area and positioning of artillery emplacements.
The
Battle of Okinawa lasted from 01 April – 22 June 1945. By the time the
battle ended 81 days later, the number killed on both sides, along with
civilian deaths, had averaged approximately 493.5 deaths per square mile.
Details
of the battle have been well documented elsewhere. Battle details
mentioned in this document are used to provide a historical perspective
of the environment, activities, and movement of units who used and
evaluated the Snooperscopes and Sniperscopes. These factors are relevant
when reviewing the after-action reports submitted by these units.
Movement of the Divisions during April 1945
Equipping the 10th Army
*
100 of the 140 Snooperscopes issued to the U.S. Army 27th Infantry
Division on Espiritu Santo were issued by the Engineer South/SW Pacific
training team from inventory allotted the South/SW Pacific (8) **
All Snooperscopes and Sniperscopes issued to the units of the III
Amphibious Corps were issued by the Engineer South/SW Pacific training
team from the inventory allotted to the South/SW Pacific (8) Okinawa - Sniperscope & Snooperscope Logistics, Maintenance, Security
The
Corps of Engineers had yet to establish logistics, supply, spare parts,
support, and maintenance personnel for the Snooperscopes and
Sniperscopes. Determining these needs was one of the goals of each of
the Engineer training teams. For short term logistics, maintenance, and
repair on Okinawa, each battalion of each division, both Army and
Marines, had to provide their personnel who were then trained for these
tasks by Capt. Patterson’s team. This was not well received as it
required reassigning personnel who were needed elsewhere. The
batteries for the Snooperscopes and Sniperscopes needed to be recharged
daily for use the next night. Because of the concerns for the security
of the top-secret Snooperscope and Sniperscope and fear of capture by
the enemy, each maintenance team was required to collect all of their
battalion’s Snooperscopes, Sniperscopes, and related equipment every
morning and return the items for use the next night.
The quantity
and weight of all the equipment required the use of a truck. No trucks
had been provided for this purpose. Spare trucks were in short supply
and already committed to other tasks requiring each maintenance team to
locate and borrow a truck when not in use. The lack of trucks, current
combat conditions, and/or weather conditions sometimes prevented the
equipment from being returned to their assigned units for the next
night.
Logistical challenges were multiplied for the maintenance
units of the 6th Marine Division when trying to keep up with their
units. The light enemy resistance they encountered allowed for the rapid
movement of their battalions to secure the northern half of Okinawa.
Deployment & Use of the Sniperscopes and Snooperscopes on Okinawa
It
is important to note, at this point, Capt. Patterson’s report was
limited to 01 Apr to 15 Apr 1945. This will be discussed in more detail
later in this document. The
Snooperscopes and Sniperscopes were not provided to special sniper
units. Decisions on how best to deploy the equipment, who would use it,
and how they would use it was left to each battalion to decide based on
their own experience.
Some units tried them on night-time
patrols, some tried them during offensive actions. All quickly came to
the same conclusion: the equipment was best suited for use with their
night-time defensive perimeters, particularly when teamed up with or
near machine gun or light machine gun positions.
On the islands
before the Ryukyus and Okinawa, small units of Japanese sappers
routinely and regularly attempted to penetrate the Allied defenses at
night. This had a significant negative impact on Allied operations.
Hunting down the individual sappers within Allied perimeters tied up
resources and made sleep difficult, if not impossible.
Captain
Patterson’s report indicates the terrain on Okinawa was not as
conducive to night-time sapper attacks as some of the islands prior. A
common comment by the soldiers who used the infrared equipment was they
wished they would have had it for the invasion and combat on Leyte.
Since his report was limited to the first two weeks of the invasion, it
could not include the hindsight later gained of the Japanese battle
plans for Okinawa during the first few weeks.
The Japanese
strategy was minimal resistance to the invasion and initial allied
advances. The majority of their forces lay in wait inland in positions
better suited for defense. The preparation of these defensive positions
had been ongoing for over a year. They planned to fight from these
well-protected inland defenses to weaken the allies before launching
offensive attacks. The primary goal was to inflict the heaviest losses
possible on the allies to weaken their forces for the eventual attack on
Japan.
As a result, the Allied invasion and initial progress
inland met with little resistance for the first two days. Light
resistance increased as the XXIV Corps proceeded south and began
encountering the various defensive positions. By April 5th, the Allied
advance was effectively halted. Forward Allied defensive perimeters
became more static with slow progress made thereafter.
The first
Japanese major counter-attack began April 12th with intense artillery
bombardments that were a significant impediment to the redeployment of
the Sniperscope and Snooperscope equipment during this time. The
bombardments were followed by night time infiltrations of the Allied
front lines. The main counter-attacks followed on April 13th and 14th.
Both attacks failed with the losses by the Japanese being so heavy that the
commanding Japanese General wrote that while Allied forces were
vulnerable to night time attack, the losses sustained due to
overwhelming and accurate allied firepower was not worth any further
large scale counter attacks. It was his opinion they could cause more
damage to the allies from their defensive positions (15).
Capt.
Patterson’s report included only three examples of the effectiveness of
the Snooperscopes and Sniperscopes during the first two weeks. The
majority of his time had been spent with HQ XXIV Corps, the 96th
Infantry Division, and the 7th Infantry Division. These divisions were
encountering the stiffest enemy resistance and therefore provided the
most complete and comprehensive source of info relative to the
Sniperscope and Snooperscope equipment within the time allowed (1).
The 27th and 77th Divisions had been held in reserve during the
evaluation period. Reports submitted by the Marines did not include
examples of combat use (detailed farther below).
On the night of
11 April, a snooperscope operator with a battalion of the 96th Division
detected an infiltration attempt. One company reported 25 enemies killed,
with another company reporting 16 more killed with machine-gun fire
directed by another snooperscope operator in the emplacement.
On
another night, a snooperscope operator with a unit of the 96th Division
spotted an 8 man Japanese patrol attempting to infiltrate under cover of
a sea wall. The 8 man team was wiped out by machine-gun fire directed
by the snooperscope operator.
Another night when a Sniperscope
operator detected a 4 man patrol attempting infiltration, communication
with a nearby BAR emplacement directed fire effectively and eliminated
the group.
Enemy casualties reported directly to Capt. Patterson,
by the 7th and 96th Divisions for the period of 01 Apr to 16 Apr, was 150
enemy casualties directly and indirectly attributed to the
Snooperscopes and Sniperscopes. The actual number killed was estimated
to be higher as the 150 represented only those confirmed. This
represented a total of about 3% of the total enemy casualties credited
to these two divisions during this time. This estimate did not indicate
if the 3% included both daytime time and night time casualties. Also
absent were the casualty assessments by the other Army Divisions or the
USMC Divisions. The 3% estimate was 3% of the casualties inflicted by
the 7th and 96th Divisions.
Later casualty claims by the media
and authors have included 30% of the enemy casualties during the first
week, 33% during the first two weeks, and 33% during the first three
weeks. Those who cite a source for this information indicate an article
authored by William Garstang, president of Electronic Labs, published in
the April 1946 issue of the Electronic Labs employee newsletter The
Electronic Beacon. The article does not refer to casualties, nor does it
indicate the number of Sniperscopes manufactured and/or used on
Okinawa, as some authors have claimed.
The earliest publications
found to have made these casualty claims have been the June 1946 issues
of The American Rifleman and Electronics magazine. Both articles were
among dozens of media articles published April 16, 1946, and later,
after an Electronic Labs news conference held at Ft. Benjamin Harrison
outside Indianapolis April 15, 1946, revealing the existence of the
Sniperscope and Snooperscope after their reclassification from “Top
Secret” to “Confidential”. This same news conference was followed by and
featured in the images that appear in the April 1946 issue of The
Electronic Beacon.
Demonstration
of the Infrared Sniperscope by Colonel Benjamin Albert, U.S. Army
Signal Corps, at Fort Benjamin Harrison, IN, on April 16, 1946.
The scope mounted on the Model T3 carbine is a Model M2 Sniperscope.
William
Garstang, president of Electronic Labs, is in the background (looking
at the camera) being interviewed by two reporters.
(photo courtesy of the National Archives)
After
Capt. Patterson’s evaluation period, the Americans slowly began taking
the Japanese defensive positions one by one in hand to hand combat. The
fighting that took place over the next couple weeks was described by
Colonel Hiromichi Yahara, senior staff officer of the 32nd Japanese Army
at Okinawa, as the worst and most brutal fighting of the entire Pacific
War. (15)
The degree to which the Sniperscopes and
Snooperscopes contributed to the overwhelming and accurate allied
firepower indicated by the commanding Japanese general is unknown.
Illumination rounds from mortars and offshore naval gunfire were a
recent addition to allied night illumination and used extensively on
Okinawa, particularly by the Marines. These “Starshells” illuminated the
battlefield and the soldiers of both sides indiscriminately. The use of
the snooperscope and Sniperscope without being forewarned of the
incoming illumination rounds resulted in damage to the equipment’s night
vision imaging tubes and the short term night vision of anyone using
them.
Some of the Marine units later commented that the
illumination ordnance eliminated the need for their Snooperscopes and
Sniperscopes, without mention of the illumination rounds revealing
Allied troops as well as the enemy. The value of the illumination rounds
versus the Sniperscope and Snooperscope depended on the circumstances
in which they were used, which included offensive unit actions at night
versus those maintaining a defensive perimeter.
Carbine Club
newsletter 178 in August 1991 included a short article on the interviews
of two American veterans of Okinawa by member Marty Black. An Army
veteran with the 2nd Battalion/38lst Infantry Regiment/96th Division
remembers training with the Sniperscope on Leyte Island in the
Philippines before the invasion of Okinawa. One of his buddies, a
Private who was a Tool & Die Foreman with Ford Motor Company before
being drafted, was chosen to be in charge of this new equipment,
including all maintenance and training within the battalion. Wounded
early in the fighting, the Army veteran was evacuated and returned to
Okinawa one month later. By that time, the Navy was continuously keeping the forward
battle areas lit at night with flares, rendering "the
infrared technique useless and needless". The Sniperscopes "had been
collected and returned to a central storage depot”. The other interview
was of a Marine veteran who also indicated Naval illumination of the
front lines eliminated the need for and usefulness of the infrared
equipment. Neither mentioned the mission objectives of Capt. Patterson’s
team or the limitations of the evaluation period. Of which they were
probably not aware. Though any training they received was part of the
same evaluation.
At a minimum, the Sniperscopes and Snooperscopes
were at least a contributing factor to the overwhelming and accurate
allied firepower during the hours of darkness. The degree of their
contribution varied more or less with the specific circumstances in
which they were used.
The performance of the Sniperscope and
Snooperscope in combat was but one aspect. There were several others
equally as important. _________________________________________________________________________________ CAPT. PATTERSON’S REPORT The Evaluation Period
At
the beginning of Capt. Patterson’s report he indicated the evaluation
period would be “1 April to 30 April 1945 inclusive”. As the report
progressed, he indicated the evaluation period was 01 Apr to 15 Apr 1945
with no reference to the longer period or why it was changed. It may
have been motivated or caused by two factors in addition to or other
than the use of the illumination rounds. The first being the mission
objectives of the four Engineer teams. The second involving the limited
time available pending the invasion of Japan. The
initial training and mission objectives of the four Engineer teams were
consistent with preparations for the customary Service Trials phase of
evaluation that typically preceded any final distribution. Service
Trials confirmed or established logistical needs for support, repair,
distribution, etc. along with training of a limited number of front line
combat troops to which the equipment was issued, used, and monitored
for a period of usually two weeks. Normally the quantity of equipment
being evaluated in these trials was divided among evaluation/training
teams assigned to different operational areas, as is indicated in the
table showing the operational areas and quantities shipped by 01 Jan
1945. While quantities issued on Okinawa are far greater than normal
Service Trials, the opportunities for these trials to happen elsewhere
had greatly diminished.
Okinawa became the last opportunity to
use and evaluate the Sniperscopes and Snooperscopes as well as
determining logistical needs before the invasion of Japan. There was
very likely a strong sense of urgency for the evaluation to be completed
and submitted, so the logistics and any necessary changes could be
completed in time for the invasion of Japan.
The use or
disposition of the Sniperscopes and Snooperscopes at the end of the
evaluation period is absent from Capt. Patterson’s report, after-action
reports, and all other reports found so far. The interview of the
veteran who indicated the equipment had been collected and placed in
depots along with the timing of the end of Capt. Patterson’s evaluation
period was consistent with the normal protocols at the end of Service
Trials. Equipment tested during Service Trials was recovered, pending
the outcome of the evaluation report, changes that needed to be made,
and establishing the necessary logistics and support before the
equipment was issued again.
In June and July 1945, a joint
services training exercise in Texas called the Sphinx Project, was intended as
part of the final preparations for the invasion of Japan. The report
prepared and submitted by the contingent from the Corps of Engineers at
the end of the operation indicated almost all of the Sniperscopes and
Snooperscopes were now in the Pacific Ocean Area of operations. The
report also indicated the Model M2 Sniperscopes were scheduled to start
production on 01 Aug 1945. (16)
The Evaluation
As indicated at the beginning of this
document, Capt. Patterson’s orders included specific details to be
included in the reports they were ordered to submit. Details commonly
found in the evaluation report of Service Trials. The
use of the equipment in combat was included but not the primary focus
of the evaluation and report. In addition to Capt. Patterson's own first
hand experience, he personally met with and solicited the
comments of those who had used and maintained the equipment in addition
to other personnel who witnessed the use of the equipment. Between 14
and 18 April 1945, he received after action-reports authored by an
officer assigned this task for each division. Most of these reports were
a brief synopsis given the ongoing operations on Okinawa. Capt.
Patterson then combined all of this information into eleven sections.
The division reports were attached at the end.
After Action
Reports and histories prepared by officers of the units on Okinawa over
the months and for several years afterward focused on all of the events
during that time. Any mention of the Snooperscope and/or Sniperscope was
very brief and within the overall context as opposed to the more
focused and detailed report submitted by Capt. Patterson. These have
included documents prepared by or for the Tenth Army, 7th Infantry Div.
Artillery, 77th Infantry Division, 96th Infantry Division, 1st Marine
Division, and 6th Marine Division.
For the sake of brevity, what
follows excludes the repetition and summarizes some of the comments.
Added are several brief items from the later After Action Reports not
included in the earlier summaries authored by other researchers.
--------------------------------------------------------------------------- (Begin Report) Section I: Introduction
This
report is intended to cover the observations and recommendations of the
author as to the combat effectiveness, tactical employment,
distribution, maintenance and supply problems, and technical development
of Infrared Equipment.
The basis of this report is the combat
employment of Sniperscopes and Snooperscopes by the Tenth Army in the
Okinawa Operation during the period of 1 April to 30 April 1945
inclusive. While conditions under which the equipment was employed did
not test its maximum capabilities and limitations, it is believed that
the observations made were extensive enough to warrant the conclusions
drawn and recommendations made herein.
The equipment has been
issued to all Infantry and Marine Divisions participating in the
operation, although some of the Divisions received only Snooperscopes.
The
information contained in this report was obtained largely by personal
interviews with unit commanders, maintenance personnel, and operators in
the Headquarters, XXIV Corps, and in the Ninety Sixth and Seventh
Infantry Divisions. I devoted the greater part of my time to these
Divisions because during my investigations, they were encountering the
stiffest enemy resistance and therefore provided the most complete and
comprehensive source of information relative to the subject equipment
available within the time allowed.
Section II: Combat Effectiveness
In
general, the reaction toward the snooperscope and Sniperscope has been
very favorable. This is evidenced by the desire of most of the units for
more of them.
Conditions:Night infiltration has been
at a minimum as compared with previous Pacific operations, so infrared
devices could not be exploited fully. Moonlight and the lavish use of
star shells tended to discourage infrared equipment by front line units.
The
relatively open terrain of Okinawa is not ideal for the Snooperscope
and Sniperscope due to their limited range. In open country the distance
between platoon perimeters is generally greater than in jungle warfare
and frequently is so great that cross illumination between Snooperscopes
and Sniperscopes is ineffective.
However, several company
commanders have indicated the equipment allowed them to increase the
intervals between adjacent elements and thus allowed them to spread
their units out over greater distances at night.
The extensive use of enemy artillery has made it difficult or impossible to bring the equipment forward for use at night.
The
equipment can be employed most effectively in jungle warfare, as
originally intended, where night infiltration is common, enemy artillery
fire is light, star shells are less frequent, night visibility is poor,
and the limited range of the Snooperscope and Sniperscope approximates
more closely the normal intervals and distances.
Examples of Effectiveness:The
Snooperscope and Sniperscope have been most effective in bringing the
fire of machine guns to bear promptly and accurately on groups of enemy
attempting to advance during darkness. [examples given are the three
cases described earlier].
Casualties Inflicted:Approximately
150 casualties directly and indirectly attributed to this equipment by
elements of the 7th and 96th Divisions. Estimated the number was more as
these were only those that could be confirmed. [note this was only
elements of the two Army Divisions, not all and does not include the
USMC. USMC reports do not include casualty numbers]
Morale:Although
the number of casualties has not been great, the increased confidence
the equipment has instilled in our troops is a major factor in
evaluating its effectiveness.
Has decreased the number of firing
at sounds or movements during the night as the source of the noise or
movement can be identified. This has decreased the jitteriness that has
resulted in additional shots fired at shadows and imagined noises.
Things have calmed down more with less fear of friendly fire incidents.
Many
operators report the Snooperscope and Sniperscope make their tour of
duty pass quickly because they can now look about their post at night.
The general feeling of confidence which this equipment instills almost justifies its use for this reason alone.
Conclusions:The
Snooperscope and Sniperscope are effective combat weapons when employed
under appropriate conditions, and the equipment is suited ideally to
jungle warfare.
Section III: Tactical Employment
Perimeter Defense:The
primary use of Snooperscopes and Sniperscopes has been in perimeter
defense of large and small units. It has proven effective at combating
enemy night infiltration when vision is poor. Whenever possible, the
scopes should be used in pairs to provide cross illumination. In some
instances, as many as five or six have been paired together in order to
obtain the desired coverage. Pairing one snooperscope between a pair of
machineguns and repeated around the entire battalion perimeter has been a
common tactic. Tracer ammunition has been used to assist with target
designation.
Some units have set up trip flares and grenades
around their perimeter and stationed Sniperscopes to cover the areas.
When a flare or grenade is tripped the enemy typically freezes in place
waiting for the illumination to cease. The Sniperscope operator(s) also
wait for the illumination to go out then scan the area with excellent
results.
Offensive Employment:The
Snooperscope and Sniperscope have not been employed offensively to any
great extent. Due to the dangers of friendly fire, night time patrols
have been non-existent. Division Reconnaissance Troops and Regimental
Intelligence and Reconnaissance Platoons have been employing their
infrared equipment exclusively for local security.
Difficulties of Offensive Employment:The
Snooperscope and Sniperscope are considered ineffective during rapid
offensive movement because of the difficulties involved in bringing the
equipment and batteries forward under fire.
Operators do not
carry the power supply and battery on their backs with the suspenders
and knapsack provided. Since the equipment is generally operated from a
foxhole, the knapsack containing the battery and power supply is placed
beside or in their foxhole to reduce the burden of the weight.
The
individual soldier has all the equipment he can carry (including his
own weapon) and cannot be expected to carry a Snooperscope or
Sniperscope forward during a rapid advance. [meaning the Snooperscope or
Sniperscope and its related equipment was issued in addition to their
weapon, not in replacement of].
Miscellaneous Employment:The
equipment was used to examine caves during daylight hours and felt to
be effective for this purpose though no enemy was encountered in caves
examined so far. The equipment was not used for signaling or
recognition, but units commented they had past experiences when the
equipment would have been of value.
Conclusions:The
Snooperscope and Sniperscope have been used as security and defensive
weapons employed in perimeter defense and the establishment of general
outpost lines at night. A wide variety of specific methods have been
used based on the particular combat conditions. No standard doctrine for
tactical deployment exists at this time.
Section IV: Training
Maintenance Personnel:Requires
about two weeks with the exact time dependent on the technical
background of the students. Radar and Radio Repairmen are the best
qualified for this work and are the best source of maintenance personnel
when available. It is possible to train personnel with less electrical
background providing they possess mechanical aptitude and the patience
necessary for precision work.
Since smaller units do not always
have qualified personnel to be spared for maintenance, the
recommendation of additional T/O & E maintenance personnel is the
most practicable means of ensuring effective maintenance.
Operators:Proper
training of operators is exceedingly important for the maximum
exploitation of the equipment. This was illustrated by many units not
having sufficient time for training due to late arrival of the
equipment. Operators complained after three or four nights of
operational use that they could see only thirty yards with their
Snooperscopes and Sniperscopes. With continued use by the end of a week,
they reported that they were able to see about sixty-five yards.
Operators
can be trained thoroughly in one week and adequately in a minimum of
four days with all training conducted during hours of darkness. It is
absolutely essential for instructors to continually check and correct
the focusing adjustments made by the operators.
Training should
stress tactical employment, first echelon maintenance, battery charging,
and pick up program and where fourth echelon repairs are made.
Future Training:The
four maintenance instruction teams which trained the maintenance teams
of the Tenth Army units are now attached to Combat Training Command, APO
957. They form the nucleus of seasoned training personnel for training
units not presently equipped with Snooperscopes and Sniperscopes and for
training personnel in the use and maintenance of newer infrared
equipment, which may be introduced in the near future.
Section V: Security
Compromise:There
is no evidence to indicate that the Snooperscope and Sniperscope have
been compromised. All reasonable precautions have been taken to
safeguard the equipment. Frontline units bring their equipment forward
in the evening and return them to the rear at night to lessen the danger
of compromise.
Enemy Use of Infrared Equipment:There is no evidence indicating the use of infrared devices in forward areas by the Japanese.
Enemy Countermeasures:Apparently
the Japanese are aware of the fact that we have been “training troops
to see at night”, but there is no evidence to indicate they have
definite knowledge of how this is being accomplished.
No
countermeasures seem to have been taken. The reduction in enemy night
infiltration might possibly be attributed in part to our use of the
equipment.
Addition from later Tenth Army Report An
Army G-4 staff report prepared much later indicating “Losses of Major
or Controlled Items” during drops by parachute to troops on Okinawa
indicates nine Sniperscopes and two Snooperscopes were among the
equipment lost. It does not provide the date and further details. (17)
Section VI: Distribution
Considerable
controversy exists concerning the most desirable distribution of
Sniperscopes and Snooperscopes. The Tenth Army Observer’s Report of 18
Mar 1945 proposing 740 Sniperscopes per Infantry Division is considered
too great for the combat conditions, transportation needs, and
maintenance personnel on Okinawa. This proposal may be more suitable for
jungle warfare, such as was experienced on Leyte.
Present Distribution: 7th Division 96th Division Snooperscopes 135 140 Sniperscopes 139 110
Survey of Tenth Army Units for their Desired Quantities & Distribution:Since
it is understood that only Sniperscopes (with Snooperscope mounts
included) are being supplied in the future, the following table
indicates Sniperscopes only. The first and second columns of the chart
show the minimum and maximum quantities desired by each unit. The third
column represents the most commonly desired quantities, and therefore
might establish a possible basis for future distribution and T/O & E
allowances. It should be noted such an increase does not necessitate a
proportionate increase in transportation since present transport
provided can handle a few extra units without overload.
The 27th
Infantry Division is satisfied with their allotment of 90 Sniperscopes
and 140 Snooperscopes. This Division feels this equipment is not
absolutely necessary for other than front line troops which need this
equipment to the greatest extent.
XXIV Headquarters Company considers 40 Sniperscopes desirable for their Defensive Platoon.
Section VII: Maintenance & SupplyMaintenance Problems:The
amount of maintenance required has been relatively high, primarily due
to main cable failures. Maintenance personnel have been able to cope
with most problems.
In general, each Division has one maintenance
team for each Infantry Rifle Battalion, one for Division Reconnaissance
Troops and such other teams as desired within various units of Division
Troops. Teams consist of one or two enlisted men.
Personnel were
drawn from the units they were serving and usually operated near
Battalion Dumps or Regimental Service Companies. Some Regiments
consolidated the Battalion maintenance teams into a Regimental
Maintenance Section. Drawing maintenance personnel from organizations
for this purpose removed them from their normal assigned duties where
they were needed, with most lacking a general knowledge of electrical
fundamentals or possessing the required mechanical aptitude resulting in
them resorting to “cookbook” maintenance procedures.
Maintenance
teams have required the use of 2 ½ ton truck or 1-ton trailer in which
to perform maintenance and carry maintenance and charging equipment.
These had to be provided by the units and placed an undue burden on
their transportation resources.
Battery Charging has presented no
problems other than their transportation. Charging has been handled by
either the maintenance teams or organization motor pools.
The
maintenance equipment provided to these teams has been inadequate for
the maintenance problems encountered. The electrical test equipment this
required would be unfamiliar to most maintenance teams.
Recommended Handling of Maintenance:Based
on the recommended distribution of Sniperscopes (see Section VI) it is
recommended the T/O & E of the Service Company of the infantry
headquarters companies of divisions, corps, and army be augmented by the
following Infrared Maintenance Repair Section.
*change to 1 for Corps and Army HQ Companies **change to 5 for Division HQ Companies and 1 for Army and Corps HQ Companies Mobile
Fourth Echelon Maintenance Repair Sections would be responsible for
supervision of battery charging, pick up and delivery and first echelon
maintenance.
It is also recommended a detachment be provided in the Engineer Service Organization (T/O 5-500) consisting of:
This
would provide the Fifth Echelon with the necessary test equipment and
skilled personnel. The Engineer Service Organization exists for this
purpose in addition to frequently having a Searchlight Repair Section.
(In anticipation of the possibility of future Infrared Searchlights
discussed in Section X below).
This plan presents a desirable
decrease in the number of maintenance personnel (most Divisions have 11
or more teams now). It is felt the reduction will be offset by the
reduction and frequency of maintenance. As an alternative current III
Marine Amphibious Corps and XXIV Army Corps Signal Battalions are
essentially fifth echelon maintenance teams with the necessary equipment
and qualified personnel.
Spare Parts & Supply:Maintenance
equipment is currently issued with one set per 10 Snooperscopes or
Sniperscopes for an estimated one-year maintenance and supply. A
quarterly supply is considered more appropriate. A monthly supply less
so as it may be hampered by difficulties in resupply.
Recommended:
a) Maintenance equip: 1 set per 40 Sniperscopes or major fraction of b) Battery charging equip: 1 set per 10 units c) Generator spares, kits: 1 set per 40 Sniperscopes (1 per 4 generators) (provides 1 set Generator spares per Battalion) This recommendation will provide:
- Considerable reduction in weight and cubage
- Conservation of Spare Parts
- Represents little change from the present
- Requires only restocking of present spare parts kits
- Reduces number of spare parts chests required to 1/4 of current issue
- Allows for double the number of Sniperscopes per number of maintenance kits
- Battery Spares Kits, Model 1560, can still be used for supplying batteries.
Section VIII: Adequacy of Equipment
General:The
Snooperscope and Sniperscope are considered generally adequate and
effective weapons without any mandatory modifications necessary.
However, certain improvements would greatly enhance the effectiveness of
the equipment.
Range:The generally excepted
maximum effective range is about 65 yards. This range is considered
adequate for jungle warfare. All personnel believe a greater range would
greatly increase the effectiveness with 300 yards being the most
commonly desired. It is recommended that all efforts be continued toward
increasing the range as much as possible.
It’s felt the density
of the present filter could be slightly reduced. Extending the 20 foot
distance the light can be detected by the naked eye to 30 feet would
provide a small gain in distance.
Battery:The
battery is quite adequate and is sufficient for one normal night’s
operation without recharging. Batteries are usually found between 25%
and 50% discharged when returned each morning. The battery charge
indicator balls are considered inaccurate when the battery charge is
greater than 75%. Most men use a small hydrometer for this purpose. With
more thorough training and experience the hydrometer is not necessary.
Durability:With the exception of the Main Cable, the Snooperscope and Sniperscope are considered sufficiently rugged for combat use.
Suspenders & Pistol Belt:The suspenders and pistol belt are seldom used and should be eliminated.
Light Source Mount:The
light source itself is adequate. The greatest objection which nearly
all men make is the position of the light source assembly below the
carbine forestock requires operators to expose themselves too much to
use the sniperscope. This causes operators to be reluctant to use the
sniperscope, particularly when under fire. It is almost universally
agreed the light source assembly should be mounted above the telescope
and positioned along the axis of the carbine so that proper balance can
be maintained.
Most operators state the light source beam is too
low. The light source should be made adjustable so the beam can be
raised or lowered to obtain full illumination of the scope’s field of
view.
Main Cable:Most men prefer the Main
Cable be one foot longer so the power supply and battery can be placed
in their foxhole. A longer cable will also tend to reduce the tendency
of sharp bends in the cable, thereby reducing the high percentage of
cable failures.
Battery Charging Equipment:This equipment has been found suitable and able to withstand reasonable field abuse.
TM 5-9340:The technical manual is adequate and complete.
Life of Component Parts:The
Snooperscope and Sniperscope have not been in use for a sufficient
amount of time to accurately determine the life of most components. The
comments that can be at this time include:
Light Source Filter & Bulb:50+ hours if initially free of defects Viewing Tube 1P25:Last
a considerable length of time if defects are not encountered soon after
initial use and if the telescope is not exposed to the direct rays of
sunlight or other intense light Vibrator:Unpredictable life span. Some cease to function within a week while others have caused no difficulties whatsoever. Other Parts:Largely dependent on the absence of initial defects and subsequent operational abuse.
Moisture & Fungus Proofing:Except
in a few cases, the telescope and power supply have been adequately
sealed against moisture. The climate has been inadequate for assessing
the fungus proofing.
Snooperscope vs. Sniperscope:Opinions
are divided regarding the merits of the Sniperscope vs. the
snooperscope. The snooperscope is lighter, more convenient for
observing, can be employed for directing other weapons, and because most
troops do not favor the carbine. The Sniperscope can do everything the
snooperscope can do, in addition to directing firepower, although it is
more cumbersome and awkward to handle.
The plans for making only
Sniperscopes and including snooperscope mounts is good as it will allow
either to be made as desired in addition to allowing the conversion of
Sniperscopes to Snooperscopes in the event the carbine stock (for which
no replacements are currently available) is damaged beyond repair.
Carbine, Cal. 30. T-3:Most
frontline troops favor the Rifle, Cal. .30 M-1 and the Browning
Automatic Rifle over the carbine due to less effective firepower and
problems with reliability. Because the T-3 carbine must be carried in
addition to their individual weapon, it is considered impractical.
A
number of the T-3 carbine stocks have been broken near the trigger
assembly. Although the number has not been unreasonably high, the
absence of immediate replacement deadlines the sniperscope.
Adaptation of Other Weapons:Most
units feel the telescope and light source should be made adaptable to
other weapons such as the Carbine, cal. .30 M-1, light and heavy
machineguns, Browning Automatic Rifle, Rifle cal. .30, M-1. Considerable
differences of opinion exist regarding the most suitable weapon.
The
technical difficulties to adapt the equipment to the machineguns is
considered impractical. Possible solutions include development of a
common adapter that could be used with all others suggested or in lieu
of this option adapters common to more than one weapon with separate
adapters for each weapon if the other options are not feasible.
Ruggedness comparable to the present equipment must still be maintained.
Conclusions and Recommendations:If
development of adapter(s) is feasible distribution recommended is 5
Sniperscopes each including a separate Snooperscope mount, and five 5
unmounted Snooperscopes with adapters for other weapons.
In
considering the suggested modifications, it should be noted this
equipment is considered effective in its present form with the
modifications intended to make the equipment more effective. The
governing factor in adopting modifications should be the time and
knowledge the modifications require given the current immediate demand
for more infrared equipment. From 96th Infantry Division HQ & USMC Evaluation Reports attached to Capt. Patterson’s Report The
preference among operators is the infrared equipment be mounted to more
capable weapons while at the same time, the extra weight of the
infrared equipment mounting is more suited for use with the carbines.
Given the limited range of the infrared scopes and their light
assemblies and the purposes for which they are most suited being limited
to defensive use for which they currently employed.
Section IX: Defects in Equipment
Main Cable, 805995:The
main cable is the weakest component and the most serious difficulty in
the equipment. Cable failures after the first two weeks of operational
use have been approximately 10%. The failures consistently occur to the
high voltage conductor approximately 5” from the power supply at the
point the outer cable shield ends and is twisted into the cable ground
lead. The cable conductors at this point have been subjected to undue
strain and twisting during the molding process making the conductors
subject to breakage
Temporary cable repairs shorten the cable
beyond the point of breakage and resolder the leads. Such repairs are
tedious, not permanently effective, and unnecessarily burdens
maintenance teams. It has already been noted the cable is considered too
short with additional shortening amplifying the objections.
Some cables in new equipment were found with split outer shell coverings.
It
is essential the main cable be redesigned with replacements made
available to replace the present cables when they become defective.
Viewing Tube 1P25:Previous
reports indicated a large percentage of image tubes “flared up” while
firing the sniperscope. Information was also received indicating the
cause may be a weak compression spring (204597) within the telescope,
not holding the image tube firmly in its socket in combination with
tubes insufficiently evacuated.
The two weeks of this evaluation
with many units not being able to test their Sniperscopes beforehand is
considered inadequate to evaluate this issue. Only 2-3% of the
Sniperscopes have exhibited this tendency.
Operators still
complain about the wide variation of quality of the telescope image,
which has largely been due to the viewing tubes. It is essential all
efforts be continued to improve the viewing tubes and reduce the
variation between them.
After very little use, a number of image
tubes have cracked at the point where they had been evacuated. One
telescope was received with a factory note attached indicating
“flickering image” with the tube ceasing to function during the first
night of use. There is absolutely no excuse for this telescope leaving
the factory when it was known to be defective.
Power Supply:Proper
electrostatic focus could not be obtained with a number of the power
supplies due to the improper range of focus control provided by the
focus knob. This is an issue that requires closer manufacturing
tolerances.
Light Source Filters:A large
number of light source filters were delivered with the entire cellophane
film flaking from the heat resistant glass. This appears to have been a
manufacturer defect limited to a particular lot, as those with this
issue were limited to certain containers, with all in other containers
not experiencing the problem.
Telescope T-120:Several
maintenance teams have discovered dirt and lint around viewing tubes
and lenses of telescopes that had not been cleaned since the factory
with the dirt particles causing malfunction of the telescope.
Light Source Bulb H196:A number of light source bulbs were defective on delivery.
Vibrator H-170:One box of spare vibrators contained 5 that would not function.
Battery AA 1451:Several
batteries had cells that would not take a charge. Batteries have not
always been unspillable resulting in the deterioration of knapsacks and
clothing by acid.
Charging Rack, Model 1542:A number of charging rack resistors have burned out without indication of overload at the time.
Recommendations:More
rigid inspection is needed by company supervision during manufacture
along with better operational testing of the equipment by government
inspectors. Section X: Supplementary Infrared Equipment
Metascope, US/F:Each
Division received 20 metascopes. A few Divisions indicated the
metascope would primarily be used in combination with flashlights
equipped with infrared filter discs for signaling and maintaining
contact during night patrols. Most units have not sent out night combat
patrols. The 27th Infantry Division has requested 180 metascopes in
anticipation of increased night activity in the more open terrain.
Flashlight Filter Discs:Issued
on the basis of 384 per Division and have provided a simple means of
converting flashlights TL-122 for night time communication and
recognition. 400 discs per Infantry Division is considered appropriate.
Snooperscope
operators can view the flashlights effectively at distances greater
than 200 yards, which is far beyond the visual range of the
snooperscope.
Flash hider:Flash hiders are
considered effective in reducing the flash when the Sniperscope is
fired. One flash-hider should be supplied with each sniperscope. [note:
with the exception of the Flash hiders having been built by the
Engineers in Hawaii, this is the only mention of the Flash hider in any
of the documents examined and does not indicate they were actually used
vs. effective if used].
Separate IR Source:There
is a universal desire by all units to increase the range of the
Snooperscopes and Sniperscopes. This can be accomplished by the use of
portable infrared light sources of sufficient power. The characteristics
desired in such sources are:
The
increased distance the device is detectable with the naked eye is
considered satisfactory. Separate Light Sources would be limited to
defensive situations due to their weight. The use of tripwires would
conserve power by turning them on only when required. Desired and
recommended distribution is 2 or 3 per Infantry Rifle Battalion.
Blackout Driving Equipment:Unit
commanders indicate Blackout Driving Binoculars and associated filter
discs for vehicle headlamps would be received favorably. A minimum of 6
sets per Infantry Rifle Battalion are desired if available.
Primary
use would be for ambulances operating in forward areas. Secondary use
for night reconnaissance and combat patrols, since binoculars (mounted
on a headliner) would eliminate present objections to snooperscopes for
this purpose.
Equipment Tests:Tests are
currently being conducted by Combat Training Command, APO 957 for
greater exploitation of infrared equipment and include:
- Methods of tactical employment
- Use of infrared flashlights and effective ranges
- Adaptation to weapons other than the carbine
- Employment of separate light sources
- Air-ground identification
Section XI: Summary of Conclusions and Recommendations
- The
Snooperscope and Sniperscope are effective combat weapons that are
employed primarily in perimeter defense against enemy night
infiltration.
- The effectiveness of this equipment is determined
largely by the combat conditions under which employed, being most
suitable for jungle warfare.
- Apparently the security of the equipment has been maintained and there is no evidence of enemy use of similar devices.
- Training
of operators and maintenance personnel requires a minimum period of
four days and two weeks respectively. Radio repairmen are the best
source of personnel for maintenance but it is possible to train men
having less electrical backgrounds with sufficient training time.
- The
average desired distribution of this equipment is about five hundred
units per Infantry Division when operating under conditions such as
experienced in the Okinawa Operation.
- Maintenance has been handled adequately.
- In
equipping organizations in the future it is recommended that the T/O
& E of the organizations listed below by augmented by fourth echelon
Infrared Maintenance Repair Sections.
- Infantry Regimental Service Company
- Division Headquarters Company
- Corps Headquarters Company
- Army Headquarters Company
A fifth echelon repair section is recommended for the Engineer Service Organization, T/O 5-5500. - Present
organizations which have been issued Snooperscopes and Sniperscopes do
not require additional maintenance and spare parts kits in
requisitioning additional equipment but should order only such
additional individual parts as needed.
- Maintenance equipment
should be reduced to a basis of one Sniperscope Maintenance Kit
(consisting of two boxes; A and B) per forty Sniperscopes, representing
quarterly requirements of spare parts.
- The snooperscope is favored by most operators as compared to the sniperscope.
- The Snooperscope and Sniperscope are effective without any mandatory modifications.
- The following improvements are recommended and would greatly enhance the effectiveness of the equipment.
a. The light source should be positioned above the telescope on the sniperscope. b. Redesign of the main cable is necessary and its length should be increased approximately one foot. c. The general quality of telescope viewing tubes 1P25 should be improved and the variance between them reduced. d. Increased range of equipment is desired. - The equipment should be made partially adaptable to other weapons.
- More rigid inspection of equipment by government and company inspectors and closer supervision in manufacture is recommended.
- Separate
and more powerful infrared light sources should be designed and
supplied on the basis of approximately three per Infantry Rifle
Battalion
- Blackout driving equipment, if now available, would be desired on a minimum basis of six per Infantry Rifle Battalion.
End of Report ---------------------------------------------------------------------------SUMMARY With
experience and hindsight, it is easy to anticipate and predict much of
what was encountered with the Snooperscopes and Sniperscopes by the
troops who used them on Okinawa. This is particularly true when that experience and
hindsight includes a comparison to the night vision technology of today.
But the evolution and progress of the technology and experience gained
the past 70+ years that has provided the hindsight were obviously
non-existent when Allied troops landed on the beaches of Okinawa 01 Apr
1945. Those first two weeks of combat on Okinawa that included the use
of the Snooperscopes and Sniperscopes were where the technology first
met actual combat experience. The results started the evolution to what
night vision devices are today.
A theme that has consistently
repeated itself over time has been events that created a demand that
often shortened the time and bypassed the normal protocols necessary for
effective research & development, evaluations, manufacturing, and
quality control. With the end results being handed to a soldier who
receives/received minimal training before they were sent into combat
with the equipment. This article has, in part, been authored so the
reader can imagine what these troops encountered with the Top Secret
bulky, heavy, quasi prototype voodoo technology that brought a
logistical nightmare with it while fighting in one of the worst combat
environments of WWII.
But those events and demands resulted in
funding and efforts normally not possible after a war ends and during
peacetime. While providing peacetime with the technology that would not
have existed had it not been for the events and demands of a war. This
theme obviously affects many different things, to include Sniperscopes and Snooperscopes.
Funding cuts and terminated
contracts at the end of WWII initially stalled the progress and
evolution of night vision devices. Subsequent limited funding slowly
moved things forward but well short of what was needed when North Korea
invaded South Korea in June 1950. It is a theme that repeated itself
with the model M3 Sniperscopes.
Over the years, stories have been
circulated regarding the use of the Sniperscopes, including combat on
Saipan, Leyte, the Philippines, Luzon, and even Iwo Jima. With
inference/assumption this use was during combat operations. The sources
used for this report make it clear some locations such as Leyte and the
Philippines were training exercises for Okinawa while the same training
on Saipan included opportunities to use the equipment and gain
first-hand experience with remaining enemy hold outs.
The mission
objectives of the Engineer teams were focused on learning on a scale
far greater than could be obtained by issuing one or two Sniperscopes or
Snooperscopes on a limited basis. Which does not mean it didn’t happen,
only that it was probably not something that would have been included in
the reports by these teams.
Reports completed by the team
assigned to the Southwest and South Pacific and/or the team assigned to
China/India/Burma may include smaller actions given the limited
quantities these teams had.
On paper Capt. Patterson’s team was
assigned on temporary duty to the 6th Marines. From 01 Jul to 17 Jul
1945, they were listed as “Forward Echelon” at Okinawa, Ryukyu Islands,
then changed to “Rear Echelon” at Okinawa, Ryukyu Islands 18 Jul to 31
Jul 1945 (18). They were deleted from the roll authority of a letter dated 14 Sep 1945 (18).
After the war, he became a physicist for RCA Advanced Systems Planning
in their Major Systems Division, working on ICBM projects (19).
The Model T3 Carbine on Okinawa
Regarding
the model T3 carbines used with the Sniperscopes on Okinawa, they were
first of two contracts received and manufactured by Inland
Manufacturing, a Division of General Motors. The first contract has not
been located. A
letter from the Subcommittee on Small Arms to the Ordnance Technical
Committee on 5 Feb 1944 indicated the Corps of Engineers had already
requested 750 T3 carbines with the carbines and related parts to be
delivered by 1 Apr 1944 (20). The letter did not indicate the
date the Engineers had made the request, but it was before the
Subcommittee on Small Arms letter 5 Feb 1944. Given the dates above,
it's estimated Inland T3 carbine production probably started at about
the time Ordnance gave their final approval of the T3 on 16 Mar 1944.
The quantity of 750 T3 carbines matched the total production run of 750
Model T120/M1 Sniperscopes. It’s not known if 750 T3 carbines were
actually produced and delivered by Inland, or if they were delivered by
or after the 1 Apr 1944 deadline.
Every Sniperscope present on
Okinawa was mounted on a Model T3 Carbine. The adapter bracket that
allowed for the Sniperscopes to be mounted to any model .30 cal. carbine
first became available with the 1950 contract for the Model M2
Sniperscopes produced by Bell & Howell in cooperation with
Cornell-Dubilier. The latter having acquired the Electronics Labs
operations related to the Sniperscope and Snooperscope in 1948.
The report indicating 9 Sniperscopes were lost during an airdrop over Okinawa (17) did
not indicate if they included their carbines, a date, location, or if
they were lost in one drop versus during several drops. Ordnance losses
from aerial drops included 1,525 cal. .30 carbines but did not indicate
any T3 carbines. Given the Sniperscopes were a separate unit of issue
than the snooperscopes, that included a T3 carbine, there is a good
likelihood their T3’s were lost with them.
The Model M2 Sniperscope
The
Engineer portion of the Sphinx Report in August 1945 indicated Model M2
Sniperscope production was scheduled to start 01 Aug 1945 with
production anticipated at 1000 a month (16). An overview of
the status of the U.S. night vision equipment developed by the U.S. Army
Corps of Engineers submitted to the British Admiralty in July 1945
indicated 1200 were being “rushed out by 01 Aug” with anticipated
production of 1500 in September 1945 rising to 4000 a month (21).
Even had 1200 been rushed out by 01 Aug, they would not have arrived in
time for combat use during WWII. The actual number of M2 Sniperscopes
produced and if contracts were canceled with the surrender of Japan is
the subject of ongoing research. ________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________ Sources
- Operational Report on Infrared Equipment, by Captain Omar L. Patterson, U.S. Army Corps of Engineers (30 Apr 1945)
- Engineers Board Report 908, Snooperscope & Sniperscope(30 Jan 1945)
- Major War Supply Contracts-Cumulative June 1940 through September 1945, Industrial Statistics Division, Civilian Production Administration (1946)
- Memorandum For The Commanding General, Army Service Forces, from the Asst. Chief of Staff, G-4 by order of the Secretary of War (25 Nov 1943), appendage to Infantry Board Report No. 1595, Infra-Red Equipment (Snooperscope and Sniperscope) (20 Apr 1944)
- Report of the New Developments Division as summarized in the Minutes, Meeting of the General Council 18 Sep 1944, 1944 Series, No. 36; Deputy Chief of Staff, War Department
- Letter from the Chief of Engineers to Capt. Omar L. Patterson (29 Sep 1944) included as an attachment in Source #1 above.
- Okinawa: The Last Battle,
by Roy E. Appleman, James M. Burns, Russell A. Gugeler, and John
Stevens (1948); United States Army in World War II, The War in the
Pacific Series; U.S. Army Center of Military History
- Participation in the Okinawa operation by the United States Army Forces, Pacific Ocean Areas, April-June 1945; by Robert C. Richardson, U.S. Army HQ (1946) - Part 3 Tenth Army, Section III Organization and Training (G-3) p. 240
- Participation in the Okinawa operation by the United States Army Forces, Pacific Ocean Areas, April-June 1945;
by Robert C. Richardson, U.S. Army HQ (1946) - Operational Report,
Corps of Engineers, Central Pacific Base Command; p. 351-352 & p.
362
- Participation in the Okinawa operation by the United States Army Forces, Pacific Ocean Areas, April-June 1945; by Robert C. Richardson, U.S. Army HQ (1946) – Part 6 – South Pacific Base Command Section VI- Engineers
- Okinawa Operational Report 77th Infantry Division, Operation Iceberg (01 May 1945)
- Participation in the Okinawa operation by the United States Army Forces, Pacific Ocean Areas, April-June 1945; by Robert C. Richardson, U.S. Army HQ (1946) – Part 10 - Assistance rendered to the Navy & Marines
- Report
on Use of Infra-red Equipment, Fleet Marine Force Pacific, Training
Memorandum 51-45, extracts from reports, 1st Marine Division and 6th
Marine Division on use of Infra-Red Equipment on Okinawa (18 Jul 1945)
- Special Action Report, Okinawa, Nansei-Shoto (1st Marine Division)
- The Battle for Okinawa, by Colonel Hiromichi Yahara (1 Jan 2002), ISBN-13: 978-0471180807
- Sphinx Project Report (Aug 1945), Engineers, Section V Night Vision Equipment, p. 315-323
- Tenth Army Action Report, Ryukyus Islands, Chapter 11, Section IV, p. 67-68
- Muster
Roll of Officers and Enlisted Men of the U.S. Marine Corps, HQ, HQ
& Service Battalion, III Amphibious Corps, In the Field, 1 Jul to 31
Jul 1945
- Courier-Post, Camden, NJ 13 Dec 1961, p. 21
- Ordnance Technical Committee item #22910 (5 Feb 1944)
- U.S. Army Infrared Devices; UK Scientific Research and Experiment Dept Admiralty - ADM 213 33 (Jul 1945); U.K. National Archives, Kews
Credits
Don Hillhouse For
his earlier research and article in newsletter 368 (Nov 2011). His work
provided the investigative leads that helped locate the documents he
had referred to and the information they contain.
Jason Patrick, Historian's Office, Fort Leonard Wood, MO For his assistance, time, and efforts that ultimately located Engineer Board Report No. 908, Snooperscope and Sniperscope
Marty Black & Dan Pinto For their review of this article and their editing suggestions
With Special Thanks to:
Andrew Stolinski Chief Researcher Archival Research Group P.O. Box 472 New Market, MD 21774 (240) 626-9270 Archival Research Group@gmail.com ____________________________________________________________________________________________ END NOTE
This
article has been prepared from information developed as part of an
ongoing active research project into the history of the infrared scopes
and equipment used with the U.S. Carbines. The research and development
of this equipment was part of an ongoing effort involving various
infrared devices by the U.S. War Department, U.S. Navy, and The National
Research and Defense Committee using American scientists, universities,
and colleges in cooperation with many private companies and continuing
after WWII with the formation of the Dept. of Defense. You can find further information on our research on the following links.
Forum Discussion Group http://www.uscarbinecal30.com/forum/infrared-scopes-and-equipment-night-vision_forum86.html" rel="nofollow - http://www.uscarbinecal30.com/forum/infrared-scopes-and-equipment-night-vision_forum86.html Articles http://www.uscarbinecal30.com/forum/newsworthy-items_forum4.html" rel="nofollow - http://www.uscarbinecal30.com/forum/newsworthy-items_forum4.html Web Pages (many still under construction as research continues) http://www.uscarbinecal30.com/infrared.html" rel="nofollow - http://www.uscarbinecal30.com/infrared.html
Please
consider sharing any information you may have on these infrared scopes,
equipment, and other devices. We can be contacted by sending a private
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discussion where a number of people may be of assistance with whatever
questions you may have or items you are looking to acquire and/or
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