The U.S. Carbine Caliber .30 | |
- Infrared -Snooperscope |  |
The U.S. Carbine Caliber .30 | |
- Infrared -Snooperscope | |
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Part III: Deployment
PreparationsFrom 19 Jun thru 01 Jul 1944, four three-man teams from the Corps of Engineers underwent two weeks of training at Fort Belvoir in preparation for deployment and training of combat personnel in the maintenance and operation of the Snooperscopes and Sniperscopes. The teams were comprised of an officer and two enlisted personnel with backgrounds in electronics, optics, and research. They were not Combat Engineers. (1, 2) On 25 Aug 1944, the Corps of Engineers Technical Committee re-classified the T-120 Sniperscope as Required Type, Adopted Type, Standard Article. The Ordnance Dept. designation was then changed from T-120 to Model M1 Sniperscope. The T-120 Snooperscope was not adopted and remained Required Type, Development Type, Limited Procurement Type. It would be replaced by adding its hand mount to the equipment issued with the Sniperscope M2. (1, 2) In mid-September 1944, the Engineer training teams were directed to proceed to their assigned area of operations and report to the Commanding General on temporary assignment for 6 months. The orders indicated they were to take their allocated Snooperscopes, Sniperscopes, Metascopes (Type F), and related equipment with them. (3)
Their mission objectives:
The Snooperscope and Sniperscope were still classified as "Development Type" (T-120) and had yet to be adopted as "Standard Type" (M1). Adoption was pending the deployment of a limited number for use by troops in combat, during which training, logistics, deployment, and use were evaluated along with the equipment. Lessons learned would be incorporated into the equipment adopted as standard.
Training & DeploymentEuropean Theater TeamThe Germans, British, and Americans knew each possessed several types of infrared viewers. Several of the German devices had already been captured and evaluated by the Allies before this team was deployed. For fear the Germans would see infrared being used by allied troops, British night driving and weapon-mounted infrared devices remained in Britain throughout the war. The British did deploy infrared viewers for detecting the German use of infrared. Late in the war, British Mosquito night-fighters were equipped with these devices for spotting and targeting German armor using infrared. They found none. The British and American Navies limited their use of infrared in Europe and North Africa for the same reasons. (1,4,7) On 01 Mar 1945, the Commanding Commander of the 1st U.S. Infantry Division was advised any Sniperscopes and Snooperscopes received were to be used for training purposes only and not deployed near combat operations (5). On 12 Mar 1945, the Fifth Army in the Mediterranean Theater of Operations reported they had received "about 25" of the Sniperscopes the first week in March 1945 but they had not been distributed to the divisions as yet. (6) No further information has been found on the Corps of Engineers European Theater team, their operations, or their use of the equipment in Europe. All information found so far has indicated it was limited to training in the rear areas. German night driving and weapon-mounted infrared equipment was used on the Eastern Front in limited quantities. All German infrared equipment found on the Western Front at the end of the war had been held in the rear areas. The units the equipment had been issued to were deployed without the equipment. A number of fictional stories have been created regarding the German use of infrared on the Western Front. Claims as to who used infrared devices first fail to take into account the history of infrared and its various different military uses. The U.S., Britain, and Germany/Austria all field-tested and used various infrared devices throughout the war.
China/Burma/India Area TeamThe team assigned to the China/Burma/India area of operations conducted training in Burma during February 1945. The limited number of Snooperscopes and Sniperscopes allocated to this area (25 each) infers the training and evaluations were limited in scope. This equipment was likely used in this area before the war ended.
Capt. Carl E. Glock, Corps of Engineers, CBI team, training members of the 475th Infantry Regiment
No further information has been found on the China/Burma/India team, their operations, or their use of the equipment in the China/Burma/India area.
South/Southwest Pacific Ocean Area TeamThe South/Southwest Pacific Ocean Area Team was reassigned to assist the Pacific Ocean area team with training and equipping U.S. Army and USMC combat personnel located throughout the South/Southwest Pacific who were to take part in the invasion of Okinawa. Almost all of their Snooperscopes and Sniperscopes were issued to these troops. No reports prepared by the Engineer team assigned to this area have been located. Their activities are mentioned in the reports of the Pacific Ocean area team and included below.
Pacific Ocean Area Team | ||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
Snooperscope & Sniperscope | ||
| U.S. Army XXIV Corps (102,250 Officers & Enlisted*) | When & Where | Training Team |
| 7th Infantry Division (1) 794 Officers, 14,689 Enlisted* | March 1945 Leyte, Philippines | Pacific Ocean Area Team |
| 27th Infantry Division (1, 11) 722 Officers, 12,766 Enlisted* | 1945** Espiritu Santo | South/SW Pacific Area Team |
| 77th Infantry Division (12) 656 Officers, 11,344 Enlisted* | March 1945 Leyte Gulf, Philippines, on board ship to Okinawa | Pacific Ocean Area Team |
| 96th Infantry Division (8) 798 Officers, 12,348 Enlisted* | February 1945 Leyte, Philippines | Pacific Ocean Area Team |
| III Amphibious Corps (11) (88,500 Officers & Enlisted*) | ||
| 1st Marine Division (9, 13, 14) | March 1945 Russell Islands & Guadalcanal | South/SW Pacific Area Team |
| 2nd Marine Division (1, 13) | March 1945 Saipan | Pacific Ocean Area Team |
| 6th Marine Division (13) | March 1945 Guadalcanal | South/SW Pacific Area Team |
The Ryukyus include over a hundred islands spread over 1,792 miles between mainland Japan and Taiwan. Most of the islands are small and uninhabited. Okinawa is the largest of these islands and is located approximately midway in the chain. Okinawa is approximately 70 miles long, an average of 7 miles wide, with a landmass of 466.02 sq. miles. The terrain is primarily mountains and jungles in the north, with mountains separating large open areas in the south. At the start of the invasion, the civilian population was approximately 500,000.
Okinawa is surrounded by three smaller groups of islands that include the Kerama islands 20 miles off the southwest coast and Iejima (Ie Shima) island several kilometers off the west coast.
The invasion of the island of Okinawa was preceded by the 77th Infantry Division invasion of the Kerama Islands on 26 March 1945, for use as a staging area and positioning of artillery emplacements. Followed by the invasion of Okinawa itself on 01 Apr 1945. It was the largest amphibious assault in the Pacific Theater of World War II. The Battle for Okinawa lasted from 01 April - 22 June 1945. By the time the battle ended 81 days later, the number killed on both sides, along with civilian deaths, had averaged approximately 493.5 deaths per square mile.
Details of the battle have been well documented elsewhere. Battle details mentioned in this document are used to provide a historical perspective of the environment, activities, and movement of the units that used and evaluated the Snooperscopes and Sniperscopes. These factors are relevant when reviewing the after-action reports submitted by these units.
The Snooperscopes and Sniperscopes were issued to each of the Divisions prior to the invasion. Decisions on how best to deploy the equipment, who would use it, and how they would use it was left to each battalion to decide based on their own experience.
Infrared Equipment Issued to the Tenth Army | ||||
| Divisions | Snooperscopes | Sniperscopes | Invasion Assignment | |
| U.S. Army XXIV Corps | ||||
| 7th Infantry Division (1) | Okinawa assault & combat | |||
| 17th Infantry Rgt 32nd Infantry Rgt 53rd Infantry Rgt Div Artillery Div Recon Div Engineers Div HQ Co. | 36 36 32 15 4 5 7 | 36 35 38 12 3 8 7 | ||
| Total: | 135 | 139 | ||
| 27th Infantry Division (1, 11) | initially reserve, Okinawa combat 19 Apr | |||
| Total: | 140 | 90 | ||
| 77th Infantry Division (12) | assault Kerama then Ie Shima Islands, Okinawa combat 23 Apr | |||
| Total: | no data | no data | ||
| 96th Infantry Division (1) | Okinawa assault & combat | |||
| Total: | 140 | 110 | ||
| Total for U.S. Army: | 375 | 339 | ||
| III Amphibious Corps (13) | ||||
| 1st Marine Division (13, 14) | Okinawa assault & combat | |||
| Total: | 76 | 74 | ||
| 2nd Marine Division (13) | diversion assault, held in reserve | |||
| Total: | no data | no data | ||
| 6th Marine Division (13) | Okinawa assault & combat | |||
| 4th Marine Rgt 22nd Marine Rgt 29th Marine Rgt | 40 40 40 | 36 36 36 | ||
| Total: | 120 | 108 | ||
| Total USMC: | 295 | 215 | ||
| Total for U.S. Army & U.S. Marines: | 710 | 554 | ||
| Sent elsewhere: | 60 | 60 | ||
| Total Manufactured: | 1420 | 715 | ||
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* 100 of the 140 Snooperscopes issued to the U.S. Army 27th Infantry Division on Espiritu Santo were issued by the Engineer South/SW Pacific training team from inventory allotted the South/SW Pacific (9) ** All Snooperscopes and Sniperscopes issued to the units of the III Amphibious Corps were issued by the Engineer South/SW Pacific training team from the inventory allotted to the South/SW Pacific (9) |
| Note: Quantities issued suggest additional shipments were made after 31 Dec 1944. |
The Corps of Engineers had yet to establish logistics, supply, spare parts, support, and maintenance personnel for the Snooperscopes and Sniperscopes. Determining these needs was one of the goals of each of the Engineer training teams. For short-term logistics, maintenance, and repair on Okinawa, each battalion of each division, both Army and Marines, had to provide personnel who were then trained for these tasks by Capt. Patterson's team. This was not well received as it required reassigning personnel who were needed elsewhere.
The batteries for the Snooperscopes and Sniperscopes needed to be recharged daily for use the next night. Because of the concerns for the security of the top-secret Snooperscope and Sniperscope and fear of capture by the enemy, each maintenance team was required to collect all of their battalion's Snooperscopes, Sniperscopes, and related equipment every morning and return the items for use the next night.
The quantity and weight of all the equipment required the use of a truck. No trucks had been provided for this purpose. Spare trucks were in short supply and already committed to other tasks requiring each maintenance team to locate and borrow a truck when not in use. The lack of trucks, current combat conditions, and/or weather conditions sometimes prevented the equipment from being returned to their assigned units for the next night.
Logistical challenges were multiplied for the maintenance units of the 6th Marine Division when trying to keep up with their units. The light enemy resistance they encountered allowed for the rapid movement of their battalions to secure the northern half of Okinawa.
Evaluation of the use and effectiveness of the Sniperscopes and Snooperscopes was but one of many tasks required of Capt. Patterson and his team. They were not tasked with a complete accounting of all events when the equipment was used or a body count. Only an overall synopsis of strengths and weaknesses. Reports submitted to Capt. Patterson by the various Division or Regiment commands were also a basic overview with few specific details.
Capt. Patterson's evaluation and report were initially intended to include all of the month of April 1945. It was subsequently limited to 01 Apr to 15 Apr 1945, with no explanation as to why. There are several possibilities, but none are confirmed.
During combat on the Pacific Islands preceding the invasion of the Ryukyus and Okinawa, small units of Japanese sappers had routinely and regularly attempted to penetrate the allied defenses at night. This had a significant negative impact on allied operations. Hunting down the individual sappers within allied perimeters tied up resources and made sleep difficult, if not impossible. A common comment by the soldiers who used the infrared equipment on Okinawa was they wished they would have had it for the invasion and combat on Leyte.
Captain Patterson's report indicates there were fewer nighttime sapper attacks on Okinawa. He attributed this to the terrain not being as conducive to these attacks as some of the islands prior. Since his report was limited to the first two weeks of the invasion, it could not include the hindsight later gained of the Japanese battle plans for Okinawa during the first few weeks.
The Japanese strategy was minimal resistance to the invasion and initial allied advances. The majority of their forces lay in wait inland in positions better suited for defense. The preparation of these defensive positions had been ongoing for over a year. They planned to fight from these well-protected inland defenses to weaken the allies before launching offensive attacks. The primary goal was to inflict the heaviest losses possible on the allies to weaken their forces for the eventual attack on Japan.
As a result, the allied invasion and initial progress inland met with little resistance for the first two days. Light resistance increased as the XXIV Corps proceeded south and began encountering the various defensive positions. By April 5th, the allied advance was effectively halted. Forward allied defensive perimeters became more static with slow progress made thereafter.
Each Division experimented with their scopes while on night-time patrols and during offensive actions. All quickly came to the same conclusion: the equipment was best suited for use with their night-time defensive perimeters, particularly when teamed up with or near machine gun or light machine gun positions.
Capt. Patterson's report included only three examples of the effectiveness of the Snooperscopes and Sniperscopes during the first two weeks. The majority of his time had been spent with HQ XXIV Corps, the 96th Infantry Division, and the 7th Infantry Division. These divisions were encountering the stiffest enemy resistance and therefore provided the most complete and comprehensive source of info relative to the Sniperscope and Snooperscope equipment within the time allowed. The 27th and 77th Divisions had been held in reserve during the evaluation period. Reports submitted by the Marines (detailed further below) did not include examples of use in combat.
On the night of 11 April, a Snooperscope operator with a battalion of the 96th Division detected an infiltration attempt. One company reported 25 enemies killed, with another company reporting 16 more killed with machine-gun fire directed by another Snooperscope operator.
On another night, a Snooperscope operator with a unit of the 96th Division spotted an 8-man Japanese patrol attempting to infiltrate under cover of a sea wall. The 8 man team was wiped out by machine-gun fire directed by their Snooperscope operator.
Another night when a Sniperscope operator detected a 4-man patrol attempting infiltration, communication with a nearby BAR emplacement directed fire effectively and eliminated the group.
The first Japanese major counterattack began on April 12th with intense artillery bombardments that were a significant impediment to the redeployment of the Sniperscope and Snooperscope equipment during this time. The bombardments were followed by nighttime infiltration of the allied front lines. Additional Japanese counterattacks followed on April 13th and 14th. Both attacks failed with the losses by the Japanese being so heavy the commanding Japanese General wrote that while allied forces were vulnerable to nighttime attack(s), the losses sustained due to overwhelming and accurate allied firepower were not worth any further large-scale counterattacks. It was his opinion they could cause more damage to the allies from their defensive positions (15). How much the Snooperscopes and Sniperscopes may have contributed to the accurate allied firepower, if any, isn't known.
Illumination rounds from mortars and offshore naval gunfire were a recent addition to allied night illumination and were used extensively on Okinawa, particularly by the Marines. These "Star Shells" illuminated the battlefield and the soldiers of both sides. Snooperscope and Sniperscope use without being forewarned of the incoming illumination rounds resulted in damage to the equipment's night vision imaging tubes, along with the short-term night vision of anyone using them. Some of the Marine units later commented the illumination ordnance eliminated the need for their Snooperscopes and Sniperscopes.
One Marine, who had been trained in the use of the equipment while on Leyte then wounded early in the fighting, returned a month later to find the Navy was continuously keeping the forward battle areas lit at night with flares. Rendering "the infrared technique useless and needless". He indicated the Sniperscopes "had been collected and returned to a central storage depot" [16]. He may not have been aware the equipment was only tested during the first two weeks. The illumination flares may or may not have contributed to the decision to recover and store the equipment after the first two weeks.
The reporting of the number of enemy casualties was not required as the focus was the performance of the equipment. The Army's 7th and 96th Divisions were the only divisions to report casualty numbers to Capt. Patterson. For the period of 01 Apr to 16 Apr, 150 enemy casualties were directly and indirectly attributed to the Snooperscopes and Sniperscopes. The actual number killed was estimated to be higher as the 150 represented only those confirmed. They indicated this represented about 3% of the total enemy casualties credited to their two divisions during this time. Inclusive of both daytime and nighttime casualties.
The after-action reports later submitted by each division did not include the number of casualties attributed to the Snooperscope and Sniperscope.
During an April 1946, demonstration by the Army and Electronic Laboratories at Ft. Benjamin Harrison in Indianapolis the Army claimed the Snooperscopes and Sniperscopes were responsible for 30% of the casualties during the first seven days on Okinawa (17). Various newspapers then published slightly differently worded versions of the Army's information without crediting their source (18). Casualty claims made since have indicated 30% during time periods varying from the first seven days (19, 20, 21) to the first three weeks (22).
On 11 Sep 1946, a local Indianapolis newspaper published an article indicating Walter E. Peek of Electronic Laboratories told a Lions Club audience the Snooperscopes and Sniperscopes were responsible for 30% of the casualties during the Leyte campaign (20 Oct 1944 - 26 Dec 1944). It is not known if Peek actually indicated Leyte or if he was misquoted (23). William Garstang, President of Electronic Laboratories, was later quoted, "...they were used in the invasion of Okinawa, on Luzon, and in the final cleanup of the Philippines". (20)
The Snooperscopes and Sniperscopes were used during training on Leyte in the Philippines, Espiritu Santo, Saipan, Guadalcanal, and the Russel Islands during February and March 1945. The long drawn out mopping-up operations on Leyte provided an opportunity for training in the use of the equipment searching caves. Captain Patterson's report includes this information but makes no mention of use in combat or casualties other than Okinawa.
The 30% claim may have been an exaggeration, disinformation, misinformation, or based on information not available to Capt. Patterson from units other than the Army's 7th and 96th Divisions. It would be conceivable if limited to night time hours during the first seven days, especially if the total number of casualties inflicted by the unit(s) reporting were limited in number.
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This report is intended to cover the observations and recommendations of the author as to the distribution, maintenance, and supply problems, and technical development of Infrared Equipment.
The information contained in this report was obtained largely by personal interviews with unit commanders, maintenance personnel, and operators in the Headquarters, XXIV Corps, and in the Ninety Sixth and Seventh Infantry Divisions.
Survey of Desired Quantities & Distribution of Sniperscopes
(submitted by units of Army 7th & 96th Infantry Divisions) | |||
| Per | Minimum | Maximum | Most Common |
| Infantry Rifle Company | 6 | 10 | 10 |
| Heavy Weapons Company | 6 | 10 | 6 |
| Battalion HQ & HQ Company | 0 | 4 | 4 |
| Total per Infantry Rifle Battalion | 40 | ||
| Infantry Cannon Company | 0 | 6 | 6 |
| Regimental Service Company | 0 | 4 | 0 |
| Infantry Anti-tank Company | 0 | 9 | 6 |
| Regimental HQ Company | 0 | 8 | 8 |
| Total per Infantry Regiment | 140 | ||
| Division Artillery Battalion | 20 | 20 | 20 |
| Division Artillery HQ Battery | 10 | 10 | 10 |
| Total per Division Artillery | 90 | ||
| Combat Engineer Battalion | 20 | 20 | 20 |
| Division Recon, Mechanized | 10 | 10 | 10 |
| Ordnance Light Maintenance Company | 3 | 3 | 3 |
| Quartermaster Company | 3 | 3 | 3 |
| MP Platoon | 0 | 4 | 4 |
| Division HQ Company | 10 | 10 | 10 |
| Total per Infantry Division | 560 | ||
Conditions: |
Night infiltration has been at a minimum as compared with previous Pacific operations, so infrared devices could not be exploited fully. Moonlight and the lavish use of star shells tended to discourage infrared equipment by front line units.
The relatively open terrain of Okinawa is not ideal for the Snooperscope and Sniperscope due to their limited range. In open country, the distance between platoon perimeters is generally greater than in jungle warfare and frequently is so great that cross illumination between Snooperscopes and Sniperscopes is ineffective.
However, several company commanders have indicated the equipment allowed them to increase the intervals between adjacent elements and thus allowed them to spread their units out over greater distances at night.
The extensive use of enemy artillery has made it difficult or impossible to bring the equipment forward for use at night.
The equipment can be employed most effectively in jungle warfare, as originally intended, where night infiltration is common, enemy artillery fire is light, star shells are less frequent, night visibility is poor, and the limited range of the Snooperscope and Sniperscope approximates more closely the normal intervals and distances.
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Examples of Effectiveness: | The Snooperscope and Sniperscope have been most effective in bringing the fire of machine guns to bear
promptly and accurately on the enemy or groups of enemies attempting to advance during darkness. [examples given are the three cases described earlier].
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Casualties Inflicted: |
Approximately 150 casualties were directly and indirectly attributed to this equipment by elements of the 7th and 96th Divisions. Estimated the number was more as these were only those that could be confirmed. [note this was only two of the four Army Divisions and does not include the USMC. USMC reports do not include casualty numbers]
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Morale: |
Although the number of casualties has not been great, the increased confidence the equipment has instilled in our troops is a major factor in evaluating its effectiveness.
Has decreased the number of firings at sounds or movements during the night as the source of the noise or movement can be identified. This has decreased the jitteriness that has resulted in additional shots fired at shadows and imagined noises. Things have calmed down more with less fear of friendly fire incidents.
Many operators report the Snooperscope and Sniperscope make their tour of duty pass quickly because they can now look about their post at night.
The general feeling of confidence that this equipment instills almost justifies its use for this reason alone.
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Conclusions: | The Snooperscope and Sniperscope are effective combat weapons when employed under appropriate conditions, and the equipment is suited ideally to jungle warfare. | ||||||||
Tactical Employment | |||||||||
Perimeter Defense: | The primary use of Snooperscopes and Sniperscopes has been in perimeter defense of large and small units. It has proven effective at combating enemy night infiltration when vision is poor. Whenever possible, the scopes should be used in pairs to provide cross illumination. In some instances, as many as five or six have been paired together in order to obtain the desired coverage. Pairing one Snooperscope between a pair of machineguns and repeated around the entire battalion perimeter has been a common tactic. Tracer ammunition has been used to assist with target designation.
Some units have set up trip flares and grenades around their perimeter and stationed Sniperscopes to cover the areas. When a flare or grenade is tripped the enemy typically freezes in place waiting for the illumination to cease. The Sniperscope operator(s) also wait for the illumination to go out then scan the area with excellent results.
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Offensive Employment: | The Snooperscope and Sniperscope have not been employed offensively to any great extent. Due to the dangers of friendly fire, nighttime patrols have been non-existent. Division Reconnaissance Troops and Regimental Intelligence and Reconnaissance Platoons have been employing their infrared equipment exclusively for local security.
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Difficulties of Offensive Employment: | The Snooperscope and Sniperscope are considered ineffective during rapid offensive movement because of the difficulties involved in bringing the equipment and batteries forward under fire.
Operators do not carry the power supply and battery on their backs with the suspenders and knapsack provided. Since the equipment is generally operated from a foxhole, the knapsack containing the battery and power supply is placed beside or in their foxhole to reduce the burden of the weight.
The individual soldier has all the equipment he can carry (including his own weapon) and cannot be expected to carry a Snooperscope or Sniperscope forward during a rapid advance. [meaning the Snooperscope or Sniperscope and its related equipment was issued in addition to their weapon, not in replacement of].
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Miscellaneous Employment: | The equipment was used to examine caves during daylight hours and felt to be effective for this purpose though no enemy was encountered in caves examined so far. The equipment was not used for signaling or recognition, but units commented they had past experiences when the equipment would have been of value.
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Conclusions: | The Snooperscope and Sniperscope have been used as security and defensive weapons employed in perimeter defense and the establishment of general outpost lines at night. A wide variety of specific methods have been used based on the particular combat conditions. No standard doctrine for tactical deployment exists at this time. | ||||||||
Security | |||||||||
Compromise: | There is no evidence to indicate that the Snooperscope and Sniperscope have been compromised.
All reasonable precautions have been taken to safeguard the equipment. Frontline units bring their equipment forward in the evening and return them to
the rear in the morning to lessen the danger of compromise.
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Enemy Use of Infrared Equip.: | There is no evidence indicating the use of infrared devices in the forward areas by the Japanese.
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Enemy Countermeasures: | Apparently, the Japanese are aware of the fact that we have been "training troops to see at night", but there is no evidence to indicate they have a definite knowledge of how this is being accomplished.
No countermeasures seem to have been taken. The reduction in enemy night infiltration might possibly be attributed in part to our use of the equipment.
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(from later Tenth Army Report) | An Army G-4 staff report prepared much later indicating "Losses of Major or Controlled Items" during drops by parachute to troops on Okinawa indicates nine Sniperscopes and two Snooperscopes were among the equipment lost. It does not provide the date or further details. (24) | ||||||||
Maintenance & Supply | |||||||||
Maintenance Problems: | The amount of maintenance required has been relatively high, primarily due to main cable failures. Maintenance personnel have been able to cope with most problems.
In general, each Division has one maintenance team for each Infantry Rifle Battalion, one for Division Reconnaissance Troops, and such other teams as desired within various units of Division Troops. Teams consist of one or two enlisted men.
Personnel were drawn from the units they were serving and usually operated near Battalion Dumps or Regimental Service Companies. Some Regiments consolidated the Battalion maintenance teams into a Regimental Maintenance Section. Drawing maintenance personnel from organizations for this purpose removed them from their normal assigned duties where they were needed, with most lacking a general knowledge of electrical fundamentals or possessing the required mechanical aptitude resulting in them resorting to "cookbook" maintenance procedures. Maintenance teams have required the use of a 2 ½ ton truck or 1-ton trailer in which to perform maintenance and carry maintenance and charging equipment. These had to be provided by the units and placed an undue burden on their transportation resources.
Battery Charging has presented no problems other than their transportation. Charging has been handled by either the maintenance teams or organization motor pools.
The maintenance equipment provided to these teams has been inadequate for the maintenance problems encountered. The electrical test equipment this required would be unfamiliar to most maintenance teams.
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Spare Parts | Maintenance equipment is currently issued with one set per 10 Snooperscopes or Sniperscopes for an estimated one-year maintenance and supply. A quarterly supply is considered more appropriate. A monthly supply, less so as it may be hampered by difficulties in resupply.
Recommended:
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Adequacy of Equipment | |||||||||
General: | The Snooperscope and Sniperscope are considered generally adequate and effective weapons without any mandatory modifications necessary. However, certain improvements would greatly enhance the effectiveness of the equipment.
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Range: | The generally excepted maximum effective range is about 65 yards. This range is considered adequate for jungle warfare. All personnel believe a greater range would greatly increase the effectiveness with 300 yards being the most commonly desired. It is recommended that all efforts be continued toward increasing the range as much as possible.
It's felt the density of the present filter could be slightly reduced. Extending the 20-foot distance the light can be detected by the naked eye to 30 feet would provide a small gain in distance.
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Battery: | The battery is quite adequate and is sufficient for one normal night's operation without recharging. Batteries are usually found between 25% and 50% discharged when returned each morning. The battery charge indicator balls are considered inaccurate when the battery charge is greater than 75%. Most men use a small hydrometer for this purpose. With more thorough training and experience, the hydrometer is not necessary.
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Durability: | With the exception of the Main Cable, the Snooperscope and Sniperscope are considered sufficiently rugged for combat use.
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Suspenders & | The suspenders and pistol belt(s) are seldom used and should be eliminated.
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Light Source Mount: |
The light source itself is adequate. The greatest objection which nearly all men make is the position of the light source assembly below the carbine fore stock requires operators to expose themselves too much to use the Sniperscope. This causes operators to be reluctant to use the Sniperscope, particularly when under fire. It is almost universally agreed the light source assembly should be mounted above the telescope and positioned along the axis of the carbine so that proper balance can be maintained.
Most operators state the light source beam is too low. The light source should be made adjustable so the beam can be raised or lowered to obtain full illumination of the scope's field of view.
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Main Cable: | Most men prefer the Main Cable to be one foot longer so the power supply and battery can be placed in their foxhole. A longer cable will also tend to reduce the tendency of sharp bends in the cable, thereby reducing the high percentage of cable failures.
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Battery Charging Equipment: | This equipment has been found suitable and able to withstand reasonable field abuse.
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TM 5-9340: | The technical manual is adequate and complete.
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Life of | The Snooperscope and Sniperscope have not been in use for a sufficient amount of time to
accurately determine the life of most components. Comments at this time include:
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Moisture & Fungus Proofing: | Except in a few cases, the telescope and power supply have been adequately sealed against moisture. The climate has been inadequate for assessing the fungus proofing.
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Snooperscope vs. Sniperscope: |
Opinions are divided regarding the merits of the Sniperscope vs. the Snooperscope. The Snooperscope is lighter, more convenient for observing, can be employed for directing other weapons, and because most troops do not favor the carbine. The Sniperscope can do everything the Snooperscope can do, in addition to directing firepower, although it is more cumbersome and awkward to handle.
The plans for making only Sniperscopes and including Snooperscope mounts is good as it will allow either to be made as desired in addition to allowing the conversion of Sniperscopes to Snooperscopes in the event the carbine stock (for which no replacements are currently available) is damaged beyond repair.
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Carbine, Cal. 30. T-3: | Most front line troops favor the Rifle, Cal. .30 M-1, and the Browning Automatic Rifle over the carbine due to less effective firepower and problems with reliability. Because the T-3 carbine must be carried in addition to their individual weapon, it is considered impractical.
A number of the T-3 carbine stocks have been broken near the trigger assembly. Although the number has not been unreasonably high, the absence of immediate replacements deadlines the Sniperscope.
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Adaptation of Other Weapons: | Most units feel the telescope and light source should be made adaptable to other weapons such as the Carbine, cal. .30 M-1, light and heavy machine guns, Browning Automatic Rifle, Rifle cal. .30, M-1. Considerable differences of opinion exist regarding the most suitable weapon.
The technical difficulties to adapt the equipment to the machine guns are considered impractical. Possible solutions include the development of a common adapter that could be used with all others suggested or in lieu of this option adapters common to more than one weapon with separate adapters for each weapon if the other options are not feasible. Ruggedness comparable to the present equipment must still be maintained.
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Conclusions and Recommendations: |
If the development of adapter(s) is feasible, distribution recommended is five Sniperscopes each including a separate Snooperscope mount, and five unmounted Snooperscopes with adapters for other weapons.
In considering the suggested modifications, it should be noted this equipment is considered effective in its present form with the modifications intended to make the equipment more effective. The governing factor in adopting modifications should be the time and knowledge the modifications require given the current immediate demand for more infrared equipment.
[From 96th Infantry Division HQ & USMC Evaluation Reports attached to this report: The preference among operators is the infrared equipment be mounted to more capable weapons while at the same time, the extra weight of the infrared equipment is more suited for use with the carbines. Which share the limited range of the infrared scopes and their light assemblies.] | ||||||||
Defects in Equipment | |||||||||
Main Cable: | The main cable is the weakest component and the most serious difficulty in the equipment. Cable failures after the first two weeks of operational use have been approximately 10%. The failures consistently occur to the high voltage conductor approximately 5" from the power supply at the point the outer cable shield ends and is twisted into the cable ground lead. The cable conductors at this point have been subjected to undue strain and twisting during the molding process making the conductors subject to breakage
Temporary cable repairs shorten the cable beyond the point of breakage and resolder the leads. Such repairs are tedious, not permanently effective, and unnecessarily burdens maintenance teams. It has already been noted the cable is considered too short with additional shortening amplifying the objections.
Some cables in new equipment were found with split outer shell coverings.
It is essential the main cable be redesigned with replacements made available to replace the present cables when they become defective.
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Viewing Tube 1P25: | Previous reports indicated a large percentage of image tubes "flared up" while firing the Sniperscope. Information was also received indicating the cause may be a weak compression spring (204597) within the telescope, not holding the image tube firmly in its socket in combination with tubes insufficiently evacuated.
The two weeks of this evaluation with many units not being able to test their Sniperscopes beforehand is considered inadequate to evaluate this issue. Only 2-3% of the Sniperscopes have exhibited this tendency. Operators still complain about the wide variation of quality of the telescope image, which has largely been due to the viewing tubes. It is essential all efforts be continued to improve the viewing tubes and reduce the variation between them. After very little use, a number of image tubes have cracked at the point where they had been evacuated. One telescope was received with a factory note attached indicating "flickering image" with the tube ceasing to function during the first night of use. There is absolutely no excuse for this telescope leaving the factory when it was known to be defective.
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Power Supply: | Proper electrostatic focus could not be obtained with a number of the power supplies due to the improper range of focus control provided by the focus knob. This is an issue that requires closer manufacturing tolerances.
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Light Source Filters: | A large number of light source filters were delivered with the entire cellophane film flaking from the heat-resistant glass. This appears to have been a manufacturer defect limited to a particular lot, as those with this issue were limited to certain containers, with all in other containers not experiencing the problem.
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Telescope T-120: | Several maintenance teams have discovered dirt and lint around viewing tubes and lenses of telescopes that had not been opened since leaving the factory. Such dirt particles cause malfunctioning of the telescope.
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Light Source Bulb: | A number of light source bulbs were defective on delivery.
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Vibrator | One box of spare vibrators contained 5 that would not function.
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Battery: | Several batteries had cells that would not take a charge. Batteries have not always been unspillable resulting in the deterioration of knapsacks and clothing by acid.
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Charging Rack: | A number of charging rack resistors have burned out without indication of overload at the time.
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Recommendations: | More rigid inspection is needed by company supervision during manufacture along with better operational testing of the equipment by government inspectors. | ||||||||
| 1. | The Snooperscope and Sniperscope are effective combat weapons that are employed primarily in perimeter defense against enemy night infiltration. | |
| 2. | The effectiveness of this equipment is determined largely by the combat conditions under which employed, being most suitable for jungle warfare. | |
| 3. | Apparently, the security of the equipment has been maintained and there is no evidence of enemy use of similar devices. | |
| 4. | Training of operators and maintenance personnel requires a minimum period of four days and two weeks respectively. Radio repairmen are the best source of personnel for maintenance, but it is possible to train men having less electrical backgrounds with sufficient training time. | |
| 5. | The average desired distribution of this equipment is about five hundred units per Infantry Division when operating under conditions such as experienced in the Okinawa Operation. | |
| 6. | Maintenance has been handled adequately. | |
| 7. | In equipping organizations in the future, it is recommended that the T/O & E of the organizations
listed below be augmented by a fourth echelon Infrared Maintenance Repair Sections. - Infantry Regimental Service Company - Division Headquarters Company - Corps Headquarters Company - Army Headquarters Company A fifth echelon repair section is recommended for the Engineer Service Organization, T/O 5-5500. | |
| 8. | Present organizations which have been issued Snooperscopes and Sniperscopes do not require additional maintenance and spare parts kits in requisitioning additional equipment but should order only such additional individual parts as needed. | |
| 9. | Maintenance equipment should be reduced to a basis of one Sniperscope Maintenance Kit (consisting of boxes A and B) per forty Sniperscopes. | |
| 10. | The Snooperscope is favored by most operators as compared to the Sniperscope. | |
| 11. | The Snooperscope and Sniperscope are effective without any mandatory modifications. | |
| 12. | The following improvements are recommended and would greatly enhance the effectiveness of the equipment. a. The light source should be positioned above the telescope on the Sniperscope. b. Redesign of the main cable is necessary, and its length should be increased approximately one foot. c. The general quality of telescope viewing tubes 1P25 should be improved and the variance between them reduced. d. Increased range of equipment is desired. | |
| 13. | The equipment should be made partially adaptable to other weapons. | |
| 14. | More rigid inspection of equipment by government and company inspectors and closer supervision in manufacture is recommended. | |
| 15. | Separate and more powerful infrared light sources should be designed and supplied on the basis of approximately three per Infantry Rifle Battalion. | |
| 16. | Blackout driving equipment, if now available, would be desired on a minimum basis of six per Infantry Rifle Battalion. |
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The report indicating 9 Sniperscopes were lost during an airdrop over Okinawa (24) did not indicate if they included their T3 carbines. Ordnance losses from aerial drops included 1,525 carbines but did not specify the model numbers. Since each Sniperscope as issued was mounted on a T3 carbine and the Sniperscopes would be unlikely to be used without them there is a good likelihood their T3's were lost with them.
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The Snooperscope and Sniperscope were the world's first man-portable night vision devices to be manufactured in quantity and used by troops in combat on a large scale. Exceeded in number only by the Navy's tens of thousands of infrared viewers (metascopes and image tube scopes) primarily used in the Pacific for ship to ship and ship to shore communications.
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Contracts for production of the M2 Sniperscope (T230) that would include the changes and improvements to the M1 Sniperscope and Snooperscope designs had been awarded in September 1944 and January 1945. The first shipment was anticipated in August 1945. Even though no more M1 Sniperscopes were produced after their first contracts were completed in 1944, they were not replaced by the M2 Sniperscope. They were adopted and remained in use well into the 1950s.
In subsequent models, the Snooperscope was eliminated as a separate assembly and a handheld mount was added to the Sniperscope assembly. The telescopes used with the Snooperscopes and Sniperscopes were manufactured without regard as to which set they would eventually be used with. Their nameplates do not identify them as Snooperscope or Sniperscope. They identify them as Telescope, T-120 (25). The telescope serial number was used as the equipment serial number. The power packs labeled as Sniperscope or Snooperscope were identical. The only difference was their labels. The 1,420 T-120/M1 Snooperscope assemblies could be used as Sniperscopes or their parts could be used for replacements/parts.
Serial numbers observed to date have ranged from 485 to 2078. It is not known if the total range of serial numbers were 1 - 2135 or if some numbers were discarded with telescopes that failed to pass inspection(s) and could not be salvaged. The manufacture of spare bodies for use as replacements was standard practice. It is not known if the spares would have their own serial number plates or if they would receive the serial number plate of the body they replaced.
What is known is a total production of 2,135 complete T-120/M1 telescopes with serial numbers starting at 1 were used to assemble 715 Sniperscopes and 1,420 Snooperscopes. With at least half the Snooperscopes and at least 77% of the Sniperscopes produced having been issued for use on Okinawa.
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[1] Operational Report on Infrared Equipment, by Captain Omar L. Patterson, U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, 30 Apr 1945
[2] Report 908, Snooperscope and Sniperscope, Project XR 441, 30 Jan 1945, Capt. Edmund R. Ricker, Corps of Engineers,
Fort Belvoir, Virginia
[3] Minutes of the War Department General Council, General Borden of the New Developments Division, 18 Sep 1944
[4] Applied Physics: Electronics, Optics, Metallurgy, Office of Scientific Research and Development, May 1948
[5] Communication from the HQ 1st U.S. Infantry Division, Drove, Germany, G-4 (Logistics) Journal, 01 Mar 1945
[6] Army Ground Forces Board, Mediterranean Theater of Operations, Summary of various new weapons evaluated, 12 Mar 1945
[7] U.S. Army Infrared Devices; UK Scientific Research and Experiment Dept Admiralty - ADM 213 33, Jul 1945;
U.K. National Archives, Kews
[8] Okinawa: The Last Battle, by Roy E. Appleman, James M. Burns, Russell A. Gugeler, and John Stevens, 1948;
United States Army in World War II, The War in the Pacific Series; U.S. Army Center of Military History
[9] Participation in the Okinawa operation by the United States Army Forces, Pacific Ocean Areas, April-June 1945;
by Robert C. Richardson, U.S. Army HQ (1946) - Part 3 Tenth Army, Section III Organization and Training (G-3) p. 240
[10] ibid, Operational Report, Corps of Engineers, Central Pacific Base Command; p. 351-352 & p. 362
[11] ibid, Part 6 - South Pacific Base Command Section VI- Engineers
[12] Okinawa Operational Report 77th Infantry Division, Operation Iceberg, 01 May 1945
[13] Report on Use of Infra-red Equipment, Fleet Marine Force Pacific, Training Memorandum 51-45, extracts from reports,
1st Marine Division and 6th Marine Division on use of Infra-Red Equipment on Okinawa, 18 Jul 1945
[14] Special Action Report, Okinawa, Nansei-Shoto (1st Marine Division)
[15] The Battle for Okinawa, by Colonel Hiromichi Yahara, 1 Jan 2002 (ISBN-13: 978-0471180807)
[16] "More (or Less) on Sniperscopes on Okinawa, April-June 1945" by Marty Black, Carbine Club newsletter 178, August 1991
[17] "Army Shows Indianapolis-Made Rifle Sight for Night Fighting" by Edward H. Ziegner, The Indianapolis News, page 4, 16 Apr 1946
[18] "Sniperscope Secret Bared" Dayton Herald, Dayton, OH, 16 Apr 1946
[19] "Santa Goes Electric" by Don Romero, Mechanix Illustrated, Dec 1946
[20] "Piercing the Darkness, The U.S. T3 Carbine" by Bruce Canfield, American Rifleman Feb 2020
[21] The Complete Book of U.S. Sniping, p. 180, by Peter Senich, 1998
[22] RCA Advertisement, National Geographic, 01 Oct 1946 (and various other magazines)
[23] "Sniperscope is Explained Before Lions", Palladium-Item newspaper, Richmond, IN, 11 Sep 1946, p. 12
[24] Tenth Army Action Report, Ryukyus Islands, Chapter 11, Section IV, p. 67-68
[25] TM 5-9341 Operation and Maintenance Instructions for Sniperscopes Model M1 and M2, Aug 1951, p. 13
Many different people have contributed to make these web pages on the Model M1 Snooperscope & Sniperscope possible. Thank you, everyone. We'd like to especially acknowledge the following individuals whose contributions have been significant. In alphabetical order:
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Marc Beaudry,
Rick Larson,
William Morris,
Jason Patrick (Historian's Office, U.S. Army Engineer School),
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Articles | Infrared Forum | ||
| The Newsworthy section of our forum has a number of different articles that include various articles on the infrared scopes and equipment used with the .30 cal. Carbines. |
In addition to providing a means to communicate with other owners and those of us doing the research, there are short articles on the various aspects of
the infrared equipment. Also, several posts on the ongoing research showing contract numbers, dates, quantities, serial number blocks, and more are
updated as additional information becomes known.
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